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I. INTRODUCTION:  RETURN OF THE ROMULANS2 
Cloaking devices3 are making news. Irony aside, technology once limited to 
science fiction exists today, for example in the United States’ B-2 aircraft, known 
as the stealth bomber.4 New, non-military applications are coming. For example, 
Toyota has received a patent5 for a device that makes the supporting pillars of car 
windshields and rear windows seem invisible to the driver, eliminating blind spots. 
Over the last thirty-five years, the United States Supreme Court has developed 
and deployed its own fully operational cloaking device. It works reasonably well; 
it does not quite make what the Court is doing invisible,6 although it makes it 
difficult to detect. Close examination penetrates the Court’s cloaking device to 
reveal what is really happening, much as Toto, Dorothy’s dog in The Wizard of 
Oz,7 pulled aside the “wizard’s” curtain, revealing him as a fraud. The parallel ends 
there, however. There was nothing of substance going on behind the “wizard’s” 
curtain; it was literally all smoke and mirrors. There is quite a lot going on behind 
the Supreme Court’s cloaking device; it attempts to conceal that the Court is 
routinely making policy decisions about how far federal-question jurisdiction 
should extend, all the while attributing its own policy decisions to Congress.8 
The Court has struggled with born-again9 statutory federal-question 
jurisdiction almost from its 1875 inception. The statute tracks the Constitution’s 
language,10 but the Supreme Court has never accorded the statute the same scope, 
                                                                                                                                                 
2.  The Romulans were hostile humanoid inhabitants of another planet in the galaxy in the television series 
Star Trek. They developed a cloaking device that made their spacecraft almost impossible to detect.  See, e.g., 
Star Trek: The Enterprise Incident (NBC television broadcast Sept. 27, 1968). More recently, the widely read 
Harry Potter books feature an “invisibility cloak.” See, e.g., J.K. ROWLING, HARRY POTTER AND THE 
SORCERER’S STONE 201 (1997).   
3.  Cloaking devices are a kind of stealth technology, for example, “the use of advanced design and 
specialized materials to make an aircraft difficult or even impossible to detect by radar.”  See, e.g., E.D. HIRSCH, 
JR., JOSEPH F. KETT & JAMES TREFIL, THE NEW DICTIONARY OF CULTURAL LITERACY 604 (3d ed. 2002). See 
generally Sharad Kumar, Shashank Mishra, & Shashank Gupta, Stealth Technology: The Fight Against Radar, 1 
INT’L J. OF ADVANCES IN ELEC. AND COMPUT. SCI. 44 (2014), available at http://www.iraj.in/journal/journal_file/ 
journal_pdf/12-101-141777681744-49.pdf (last visited Sept. 10, 2018) (hereinafter Kumar, Mishra & Gupta).  
4.  See, e.g., Eric Schmitt, Key Senate Backer of Stealth Bomber Sees It in Jeopardy, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 
1991, at A1; Kumar, Mishra & Gupta, supra note 3.   
5.  U.S. Patent No. 9,971,162 (issued May 15, 2018). 
6.  See supra note 3. 
7.  THE WIZARD OF OZ (Metro Goldwyn Mayer 1939).   
8.  Psychologists recognize this as “projection”: “the tendency to ascribe to another person feelings, 
thoughts, or attitudes present in oneself, . . . such an ascription relieving the ego of a sense of guilt or other 
intolerable feeling.” THE RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1150 (Jess Stein, ed. 1969).  
See infra text accompanying notes 228–235.   
9.  The first statute to confer federal-question jurisdiction wholesale was part of the famous Midnight 
Judges Act that led to Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). See Act of Feb. 13, 1801, ch. 4, § 11, 
2 Stat. 89, 92, repealed by Act of Mar. 8, 1802, ch. 8, § 1, 2 Stat. 132. It was the Federalists’ last-ditch attempt to 
hold on to power in advance of Jefferson’s accession to the presidency. Rebirth occurred almost three-quarters of 
a century later. See Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470, 470, the true ancestor of today’s 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1331 (2012). 
10.  See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (extending the judicial power to “all Cases, in Law and Equity, 
arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under 
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which Chief Justice Marshall expounded in Osborn v. Bank of the United States.11 
The Court’s varying statutory interpretations have caused trouble aplenty, leading 
one frustrated district judge to remark, “Many criteria have been laid down for 
determining when a suit arises under federal law. They can be classified, but they 
cannot be harmonized.”12 Since then, things have gotten worse,13 leading Chief 
Justice Roberts, writing for a unanimous Court exactly 100 years later, to observe 
with respect to state-created causes of action that nonetheless qualify for federal-
question jurisdiction, “In outlining the contours of this slim category, we do not 
paint on a blank canvas. Unfortunately, the canvas looks like one that Jackson 
Pollock got to first.”14 
Early on, the Court interpreted the statute with explicit reference to Congress’s 
intent:15 
The intention of congress [sic] is manifest, at least as to cases of which the 
courts of the several states have concurrent jurisdiction, and which involve 
a certain amount or value, to vest in the circuit courts of the United States 
full and effectual jurisdiction, as contemplated by the constitution, over 
each of the classes of controversies above mentioned. . . .16 
Only four months later, the Court seemed less certain about Congress’s intent. 
                                                                                                                                                 
their Authority . . . ”); see also Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470, 470. 
[T]he circuit courts of the United States shall have original cognizance, concurrent with the courts of 
the several States, of all suits of a civil nature at common law or in equity, where the matter in dispute 
exceeds, exclusive of costs, the sum or value of five hundred dollars, and arising under the Constitution 
or laws of the United States, or treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority. 
Id. 
11.  22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824). Marshall’s was a breathtakingly broad reading, extending even to issues 
that neither party raised (the Bank’s capacity to sue), merely because the issue might be present in another case. 
The Chief Justice posited a contract case, though the case before the Court did not sound in contract.  See id. at 
823–24. 
12.  McGoon v. N. Pac. Ry., 204 F. 998, 1000 (D.N.D. 1913). 
13.  For general historical discussion of the development of statutory federal-question jurisdiction, see, e.g., 
Donald L. Doernberg, There’s No Reason for It; It’s Just Our Policy: Why the Well-Pleaded Complaint Rule 
Sabotages the Purposes of Federal Question Jurisdiction, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 597 (1987); William Cohen, The 
Broken Compass: The Requirement that a Case Arise “Directly” Under Federal Law, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 890 
(1967).   
14.  Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251, 258 (2013). “Slim category” refers to “hybrid cases,” in which the 
plaintiff’s claim sounds in state law but depends on an interpretation of federal law to succeed. The clearest 
examples are negligence per se cases where the statutory standard of conduct is federal.  See, e.g., John F. Preis, 
Jurisdiction and Discretion in Hybrid Law Cases, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 145, 151 (2006). 
15.  The Court did not rely upon any extensive record. The legislative history of the 1875 statute consists 
of a single sentence the president pro tempore of the Senate uttered indicating that the bill extended to the 
constitutional limits. See 2 CONG. REC. 4986–87 (1874) (statement of Senator Carpenter). However, in early cases 
under the statute, the Court routinely cited cases interpreting the Constitution’s arising-under language, suggesting 
that the Court took Carpenter’s statement seriously at one time. See, e.g., Starin v. N.Y., 115 U.S. 248, 257 (1885); 
Ames v. Kan. ex rel. Johnston, 111 U.S. 449, 469–72 (1884); R.R. Co. v. Miss., 102 U.S. 135, 140–41 (1880).   
16.  In re Hohorst, 150 U.S. 653, 659 (1893), superseded by statute, Act of Mar. 3, 1897, ch. 395, 29 Stat. 
695, as recognized in TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Grp. Brands LLC, 137 S. Ct. 1514, 1518 (2017). 
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Tennessee v. Union & Planters’ Bank17 was the Court’s first articulation of the 
well-pleaded-complaint rule18 in its modern form. Noting that lower courts 
exercised federal-question jurisdiction even when the federal issue arose in the 
answer rather than the complaint, the Court said of federal trial courts, “it 
is . . . essential to their jurisdiction that the plaintiff’s declaration or bill should 
show that he asserts a right under the constitution [sic] or laws of the United 
States.”19 But the Court’s reliance on Congress was far more speculative; it noted 
what “Congress . . . may have had in mind, . . .”20 instead of Congress’s “manifest” 
intent. 
By the time of Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Mottley,21 the case most 
commonly associated with the well-pleaded-complaint rule,22 the Court was not 
mentioning Congress’s jurisdictional intent at all. That omission continued in a  
series of well-known cases throughout most of the first half of the twentieth 
century, as the Court continued to tinker with federal-question jurisdiction while 
reinforcing the well-pleaded complaint rule as foundational.23 
The Court’s perception of congressional intent did play a part in Skelly Oil Co. 
v. Phillips Petroleum Co.,24 which involved whether the Declaratory Judgment 
Act25 expanded subject-matter jurisdiction by allowing federal-question 
jurisdiction in cases that could not have qualified for it without the Act.26 The Court 
held that Congress intended no such expansion, but the Court’s unsupported 
                                                                                                                                                 
17.  152 U.S. 454 (1894). 
18.  The well-pleaded-complaint rule, which antedates Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 
U.S. 149 (1908), requires that the allegation of the federal issue be essential for the complaint to state a claim 
supporting relief. If the complaint, without the federal allegation(s) would nonetheless survive a motion to dismiss 
for failure to state a claim, the federal matter is not well pleaded. Mottley is the case most often associated with 
the rule.   
19.  Union Planter’s Bank, 152 U.S. at 461 (emphasis added). The Court made it more explicit in Third St. 
& Suburban Ry. v. Lewis, 173 U.S. 457, 459 (1899) (finding no federal trial-court jurisdiction “unless [the federal 
matter] appears by the plaintiff’s statement to be a necessary part of his claim”). 
20.  Union Planter’s Bank, 152 U.S. at 462 (emphasis added). Bear in mind Justice Scalia’s admonition 
about the inherent limitations of legislative history. They underlay Justice Scalia’s disdain for legislative history 
and tendency to attempt to infer Congress’s intent from statutory language only. Pa. v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 
1, 30 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), overruled by Seminole Tribe v. Fla., 527 U.S. 
44 (1996) (“It is our task, as I see it, not to enter the minds of the Members of Congress—who need have nothing 
in mind in order for their votes to be both lawful and effective—but rather to give fair and reasonable meaning to 
the text of the United States Code, adopted by various Congresses at various times.”). 
21.  211 U.S. 149 (1908). 
22.  See Doernberg, supra note 13, at 618.   
23.  See, e.g., Moore v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry., 291 U.S. 205 (1934); Smith v. Kan. City Title & Trust 
Co., 255 U.S. 180 (1921); Am. Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257 (1916). But see Gully v. 
First Nat’l Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 114 (1936) (passing mention of “this legislative policy,” referring to statutes not 
automatically conferring subject-matter jurisdiction merely because one party is a federally chartered 
corporation). 
24.  339 U.S. 667 (1950). 
25.  Act of June 14, 1934, ch. 512, 48 Stat. 955 (current version at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201–2202 (2012)).   
26.  A complaint seeking a declaratory judgment may necessarily contain one or more allegations of federal 
law that would not be well pleaded in an action between the same parties seeking coercive (damages or injunctive) 
relief. For an example of this phenomenon, see DAVID P. CURRIE & DONALD L. DOERNBERG, FEDERAL COURTS 
IN A NUTSHELL 50–53, 61–65 (5th ed. 2016).   
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assertion about Congress’s intent was wrong. Congress understood perfectly well 
that the Act would permit some new cases to reach the federal courts, particularly 
cases concerning allegations of patent infringement.27 
The Court has considered congressional intent with respect to federal-question 
jurisdiction three times since Skelly Oil,28 twice refusing to find jurisdiction. 
Despite disparate results, all three cases have one important thing in common. 
None cites any legislative history, even when discussing congressional intent.  The 
sole reference to congressional intent in Gunn v. Minton29 simply quotes the 
language from Grable that appears in the title of this Article. Grable cites no 
legislative material either, seemingly even acknowledging the omission: 
Because arising-under jurisdiction to hear a state-law claim always raises 
the possibility of upsetting the state-federal line drawn (or at least 
assumed) by Congress, the presence of a disputed federal issue and the 
ostensible importance of a federal forum are never necessarily dispositive; 
there must always be an assessment of any disruptive portent in exercising 
federal jurisdiction.30 
For its part, Merrell Dow bathes the reader in platitudes, waxing eloquent 
about the Court’s treatment of the arising-under language of the statute while citing 
only the Court’s own opinions.31 Those opinions cite other opinions; none cite any 
                                                                                                                                                 
27.  See Donald L. Doernberg & Michael B. Mushlin, History Comes Calling: Dean Griswold Offers New 
Evidence About the Jurisdictional Debate Surrounding the Enactment of the Declaratory Judgment Act, 37 
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 139 (1989); Donald L. Doernberg & Michael B. Mushlin, The Trojan Horse: How the 
Declaratory Judgment Act Created a Cause of Action and Expanded Federal Jurisdiction While the Supreme 
Court Wasn’t Looking, 36 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 529, 562–68 (1989) [hereinafter Trojan Horse]. See also infra note 
154. 
28.  See Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251 (2013); Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 
545 U.S. 308, 314 (2005); Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804 (1986).   
29.  Gunn, 568 U.S. at 258. 
30.  Grable, 545 U.S. at 314 (emphasis added).   
31.  Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 810–11 (footnote and citations omitted). 
  In undertaking this inquiry into whether jurisdiction may lie for the presence of a federal issue in 
a nonfederal cause of action, it is, of course, appropriate to begin by referring to our understanding of 
the statute conferring federal-question jurisdiction. We have consistently emphasized that, in exploring 
the outer reaches of § 1331, determinations about federal jurisdiction require sensitive judgments 
about congressional intent, judicial power, and the federal system. “If the history of the interpretation 
of judiciary legislation teaches us anything, it teaches the duty to reject treating such statutes as a 
wooden set of self-sufficient words . . . The Act of 1875 is broadly phrased, but it has been 
continuously construed and limited in the light of the history that produced it, the demands of reason 
and coherence, and the dictates of sound judicial policy which have emerged from the Act’s function 
as a provision in the mosaic of federal judiciary legislation.” In Franchise Tax Board, we forcefully 
reiterated this need for prudence and restraint in the jurisdictional inquiry: “We have always 
interpreted what Skelly Oil called ‘the current of jurisdictional legislation since the Act of March 3, 
1875’ . . . with an eye to practicality and necessity.”  
  In this case, both parties agree with the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that there is no federal cause 
of action for FDCA violations. For purposes of our decision, we assume that this is a correct 
interpretation of the FDCA . . . In short, Congress did not intend a private federal remedy for violations 
of the statute that it enacted. 
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legislative history materials.32 “[A]y, there’s the rub.”33 
The problem is not the absence of legislative history from Congress’s 
consideration of federal-question jurisdiction and diversity jurisdiction34 or even 
non-jurisdictional statutes into which the Court has implied a jurisdictional 
message from Congress.35 The difficulty is rather that none of the legislative 
history supports the Court’s continuing assertion that Congress has in mind some 
carefully calibrated policy for distributing judicial workload between federal and 
state judiciaries for cases presenting issues of federal law. The Court asserts that it 
defers to that legislative judgment, but the legislative history is inconsistent with 
the Court’s assumption. 
That assumption is the Court’s cloaking device. Behind it, the Court has 
actively created its own balance, attributing it to Congress. There is good reason 
for that. The Justices often emphasize that the Court is not, and under the 
Constitution cannot be, a policy-making body. 
Each side offers plausible reasons why its approach might make for the 
more efficient policy. But who should win that debate isn’t our call to 
make. Policy arguments are properly addressed to Congress, not this 
Court. It is Congress’s job to enact policy and it is this Court’s job to 
follow the policy Congress has prescribed.36 
                                                                                                                                                 
Id. 
32.  See, e.g., Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308 (2005) (relying upon 
Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. 804); Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. 804 (relying upon Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers 
Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1 (1983)); Romero v. Int’l Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354 (1959), superseded 
by statute, Pub. L. 98-426, 98 Stat. 1639 (1984); Skelly Oil. Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667 (1950); 
Skelly Oil. Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667 (1950) (relying upon Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 
(1946)); Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 U.S. 293 (1943); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 
U.S. 227 (1937).   
33.  WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET, act 3, sc. 1.  
34.  “Diversity jurisdiction” is a commonly used shorthand for what is more properly “diversity and 
alienage jurisdiction,” reflecting the difference between cases the federal courts can hear because (1) the parties 
are citizens of different states or (2) at least one of the parties is an alien or a foreign government. CHARLES ALAN 
WRIGHT & MARY KAY KANE, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 23, at 143 n.1 (7th ed. 2011). This Article follows 
that convention. Diversity jurisdiction antedates federal-question jurisdiction. The Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 
1 Stat. 73, created diversity jurisdiction but not federal-question jurisdiction; diversity jurisdiction has existed 
ever since. Periodically, Congress considers restricting or eliminating diversity jurisdiction, see infra text 
accompanying notes 109–136, but has only ever passed two kinds of modifications relevant here. One is to 
increase the required amount in controversy, from the original requirement of more than $500, Judiciary Act of 
1789, ch. 20, § 11 1 Stat. 73, 78, to today’s 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2012), which requires more than $75,000. The 
second is the expansion of corporate citizenship to make corporations citizens both of their states of incorporation 
and of the states where their principal place is. Act of Jul. 25, 1958, § 2, 72 Stat. 415, 415 (current version at 28 
U.S.C. § 1332(c) (2012)). See infra text accompanying notes 115–120. 
35.  See, e.g., 25Skelly Oil Co., 339 U.S. at 671 (discussing the Declaratory Judgment Act, Act of June 14, 
1934, ch. 512, 48 Stat. 955 (current version at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201–2202 (2012)); Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. 804 at 
801–11 (discussing the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938, 50 Stat. 1040, codified as amended, 21 
U.S.C. §§ 301–399d (2012)); Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 314, 320 
(2005) (discussing the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 68A Stat. 5, codified as amended, 26 U.S.C. §§ 1–8023). 
36.  SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1357–58 (2018). 
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Nonetheless, under the guise of following an unstated (and unlocatable) 
congressional policy, the Court has fashioned its own policy controlling the federal 
judiciary’s jurisdiction. It is understandable that this arouses “a sense of guilt or 
other intolerable feeling”37 in the Court. Justices across the spectrum have declared 
many times that policy is Congress’s realm.38 
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I briefly explores how Members of 
Congress, witnesses (including some judges), and agencies drastically 
oversimplify the choice-of-law process. Their remarks refer to a situation that does 
not exist and avoid recognizing the true complexity of the choice-of-law problem 
and its inherent relationship to federal-question jurisdiction. Part II canvasses the 
history of the two primary jurisdiction statutes,39 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1332, 
from their inception to the present. Congress periodically considers abolishing or 
sharply curtailing diversity jurisdiction,40 but federal-question jurisdiction has 
                                                                                                                                                 
37.  See supra note 8.   
38.  See, e.g., Omnicare, Inc. v. Laborers Dist. Council Indus. Pension Fund, 135 S. Ct. 1318, 1331 (2015) 
(Kagan, J.) (“Congress gets to make policy, not the courts.”); Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 
519, 538 (2012) (Roberts, C.J.) (“Members of this Court are vested with the authority to interpret the law; we 
possess neither the expertise nor the prerogative to make policy judgments. Those decisions are entrusted to our 
Nation’s elected leaders, who can be thrown out of office if the people disagree with them. It is not our job to 
protect the people from the consequences of their political choices.”). See also SAS Inst., 138 S. Ct. at 1357–58; 
Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 519 (2008) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(“The congressional choice not to limit the availability of punitive damages under maritime law should not be 
viewed as an invitation to make policy judgments on the basis of evidence in the public domain that Congress is 
better able to evaluate than is this Court.”); FCC v. Beach Commnc’n, Inc., 508 U.S. 307 (1993) (Thomas, J.) 
(“[E]qual protection is not a license for courts to judge the wisdom, fairness, or logic of legislative choices.); 
Roberts v. La., 428 U.S. 325, 363 (1976) (White, J., dissenting) (“The plurality claims that it has not forgotten 
what the past has taught about the limits of judicial review; but I fear that it has again surrendered to the temptation 
to make policy for and to attempt to govern the country through a misuse of the powers given this Court under 
the Constitution.”); Furman v. Ga., 408 U.S. 238, 411 (1972) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“We should not allow 
our personal preferences as to the wisdom of legislative and congressional action, or our distaste for such action, 
to guide our judicial decision in cases such as these.”). See infra text accompanying notes 230–253.   
39.  See U.S. District Courts—Judicial Business 2016, Table 4, ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. CTS., 
http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/us-district-courts-judicial-business-2016 (last visited Aug. 20, 2018) 
(on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). That Table notes the total number of civil case filings 
from 2012 to 2016 and the number of such filings that were federal-question or diversity cases: 82.3% in 2012, 
83.1% in 2013, 84.8% in 2014, 84.7% in 2015, and 79.4% in 2016. With the exception of 33 “local jurisdiction” 
cases, all of the remaining civil filings were actions by or against the federal government for which 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 1345, 1346 (2012) are the jurisdictional foundations.   
 Many other sections of Title 28 also confer jurisdiction in specialized areas, see, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 1333 
(admiralty), 1334 (bankruptcy), 1335 (interpleader), 1336 (Surface Transportation Board orders), 1337 
(commerce), 1338 (copyrights, patents, trademarks, and unfair competition), 1339 (postal service matters), 1340 
(internal revenue and customs), 1343 (civil rights cases (now all within § 1331 as well)), 1344 (election disputes), 
1345 (United States as plaintiff), 1346 (United States as defendant), and others in scattered sections, but the vast 
bulk of federal judicial business reaches the courts under the two primary statutes.  
40.  See, e.g., Diversity of Citizenship Jurisdiction/Magistrates Reform—1979, H.R. 1046 and H.R. 2202, 
96th Cong. (1979); Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1979, S. 677 and S. 678, 96th Cong. (1979); Federal 
Diversity of Citizenship Jurisdiction, S. 2094, S. 2389, and H.R. 9622, 95th Cong. (1978); Diversity of 
Citizenship/Magistrates Reform, H.R. 761, H.R. 5546, H.R. 7493, and H.R. 9123, 95th Cong. (1977); Jurisdiction 
of Federal Courts Concerning Diversity of Citizenship, H.R. 2516 and H.R. 4497, 85th Cong. (1957); Diversity 
Jurisdiction, Multi-Party Litigation, Choice of Law in the Federal Courts, S. 1876, 92d Cong. (1971); H.R. 1987, 
82d Cong. (1951). 
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been an unchallenged fixture since 1875. Part III analyzes what the Supreme Court 
is doing behind the cloak and argues that the Court is improperly placing its own 
policy imprint on federal-question jurisdiction with no evidence that Congress 
intended any such thing. 
II. THE CONFLICTS FALLACY 
A. The Constitution and Choice of Law 
The Constitution explicitly addresses conflicts of law41 in two places. First, the 
Full-Faith-and-Credit Clause42 requires states to credit “public Acts, Records, and 
judicial Proceedings of every other State.”43 That language does not, however, 
enlighten state courts about what to do when those sources appear incompatible, 
either with each other (because several states other than the forum may have 
connections with the dispute or the parties) or with the law of the forum. The 
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence is less than supremely helpful.44 
The second provision is the Supremacy Clause;45 it is a specific choice-of-law 
provision. When there is a clash between federal law and state law, federal law 
wins. But that simple statement masks the problems. “Clash” means different 
things in different contexts; some clashes must be quite direct,46 others not so 
                                                                                                                                                 
41.  Three eminent scholars point out that “conflicts of law” is insufficiently descriptive, appearing to be 
both over- and under-inclusive and resting on unstated questionable assumptions. PETER HAY, PATRICK J. 
BORCHERS & SYMEON C. SYMEONIDES, CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 1.1–1.2, at 1–3 (5th ed. 2010). Nonetheless, as 
they point out, the term is well established in the United States and in general usage. Id. This article will follow 
that convention. 
 Choice of law, the largest branch of conflicts of law, comes in two flavors. “Vertical choice of law” asks 
whether state or federal law governs a particular issue. Empire Health Assur., Inc. v. McVeigh, 547 U.S. 677, 691 
(2006). “Horizontal choice of law” involves “determining which of the conflicting rules of two or more states or 
countries should govern. . . .” Joseph P. Bauer, Shedding Light on Shady Grove: Further Reflections on the Erie 
Doctrine from a Conflicts Perspective, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 939, 939 (2011). 
42.  U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. 
43.  This is “horizontal choice of law.” See supra note 41. 
44.  See, e.g., Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S. 408 (1955); Pac. Employers Ins. Co. v. Indus. Accident Comm’n, 
306 U.S. 493 (1939); Alaska Packers Assoc. v. Indus. Accident Comm’n, 294 U.S. 532 (1935); Bradford Elec. 
Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145 (1932). 
45.  U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be 
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United 
States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land.”) (emphasis added).  
46.  Compare Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 470, 472 (1965) (Federal Rule of Civil Procedure applying 
“with unmistakable clarity” trumps a conflicting state rule because “in direct collision with the law of the relevant 
State”) with Walker v. Armco Steel, 446 U.S. 740 (1980) (Federal Rule 3 contained “no indication that the Rule 
was intended to toll a state statute of limitations,” so “no direct conflict between the Federal Rule and the state 
law”). 
The University of the Pacific Law Review / Vol. 50 
547 
much.47 Some state laws clash with constitutional provisions,48 others with 
statutes.49 Those are the relatively easy cases. Sometimes, however, there are 
clashes between state laws and important federal interests not embodied in the 
Constitution, federal statutes, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or other federal 
regulatory material. Then the Court reverts to what Chief Justice Warren referred 
to as “the typical, relatively unguided Erie choice [of law].”50 In such cases, the 
Court decides whether federal interests are so important that the Court should 
create federal common law that displaces otherwise applicable state law.51 To say 
the least, that is a messy area.52 
The Court has also held that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause 
sometimes bears on choice-of-law questions, though it says nothing explicit about 
them. For example, a state having no connection with the parties’ dispute cannot 
apply its own law in deciding the rights and obligations of the parties to a 
                                                                                                                                                 
47.  See, e.g., Stewart Org. Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 26 (1988) (interpreting federal statute lacking 
“direct collision” to overcome an explicit state law). Comparing Hanna and Stewart is instructive. The issue in 
Hanna was how to make service of process, and Federal Rule 4 in effect said, “Do it this way.” State law 
prescribed a different method.   
 In Stewart, state law explicitly made contractual choice-of-forum clauses unenforceable. Federal law, 28 
U.S.C. § 1404 (2012), allowed transfer of actions “[f]or the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest 
of justice. . . .” It said nothing about contractual choice-of-forum clauses. The Court nonetheless ruled that the 
clause was relevant to defendant’s motion to transfer. Section 1404 clearly was not “in direct collision with the 
law of the relevant State,” nor did it speak “with unmistakable clarity”—or indeed at all—to the enforceability of 
such clauses. If the Stewart Court had used the Hanna approach, it would have come out the other way. Similarly, 
if the Walker Court had used the Stewart approach, it would have come out the other way, because FED. R. CIV. 
P. 3 is the stopping point for federal statutes of limitation. See West v. Conrail, 481 U.S. 35, 39 (1987).   
48.  See, e.g., Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415 (1996) (describing how the Seventh 
Amendment precludes appellate review of reasonableness of damages awards, despite state statutory specification 
of an appellate court for that function). 
49.  See, e.g., Stewart, 487 U.S. at 26 (interpreting federal statute to overcome explicit state law barring 
judicial enforcement of choice-of-forum provisions in contracts).   
50.  Hanna, 380 U.S. at 471. 
51.  See, e.g., Boyle v. United Tech. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 522–23 (1988) (uniquely federal interest in price 
of materiel requiring recognition of federal-contractors-immunity defense); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. 
Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 439 (1964) (dominant federal interest in international relations requiring recognition of 
act-of-state doctrine); U.S. v. Clearfield Trust Co., 318 U.S. 363, 367 (1943) (dominant federal interest in 
uniformity of rules governing federal checks). But see, e.g., Bank of Am. Trust & Savings Ass’n v. Parnell, 352 
U.S. 29, 33 (1956) (Clearfield’s dominant interest not extending to questions of ownership of federal commercial 
paper); T.B. Harms Co. v. Eliscu, 339 F.2d 823, 828 (2d Cir. 1964) (question of ownership of copyright not 
dominant federal interest).   
52.  Sometimes the Supremacy Clause, even when the Court does not cite it, prevents principles from a 
federal source from applying. That certainly is the case when the Court declares a federal statute unconstitutional, 
see supra note 45, but probably its best-known impact came in Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). The 
Court, overruling Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), refused to apply a common-law rule that the lower 
federal courts had adopted: “There is no federal general common law. Congress has no power to declare 
substantive rules of common law applicable in a state whether they be local in their nature or ‘general,’ be they 
commercial law or a part of the law of torts. And no clause in the Constitution purports to confer such a power 
upon the federal courts.” Erie, 304 U.S. at 78. Make no mistake: Erie was a Supremacy-Clause decision, though 
Justice Brandeis cited neither that nor any other provision of the Constitution. But the Court’s message was clear: 
no federal law—statutory or common law—can exist outside of the areas that the Constitution commits to the 
federal government, primarily in Article I. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1–18. That was constitutional supremacy 
in action.   
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contract.53 But the Clause does permit a state with even minimal connections to 
apply its law.54 
The Supreme Court once read the Full-Faith-and-Credit Clause55 to compel a 
state to apply the law of another state in preference to its own.56 But that was a 
single case; a few years later, the Court began to retreat from so literal a reading.57 
The retreat came in stages. First, the Court ruled that the forum need not apply 
sister-state law unless the other state’s interests outweighed the forum’s.58 Then it 
said that a state need not apply sister-state law if doing so would ignore the forum’s 
fully constitutional policy.59 The Court did not speak of weighing one state’s 
interest against the other’s. 
Finally, a fractured Court appeared to converge the conflict-of-laws analyses 
under the Due Process and the Full Faith and Credit Clauses.60 The four-to-three 
plurality essentially sought “a significant contact or significant aggregation of 
contacts, creating state interests, such that choice of its law is neither arbitrary nor 
fundamentally unfair.”61 Justice Powell, although dissenting about how the 
plurality’s technique applied to the case, appeared to accept the plurality’s 
theoretical approach. Under that approach, the default appears to be that a state 
                                                                                                                                                 
53.  Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397, 408 (1930) (despite assignment of an insurance contract to a 
Texas citizen, a Texas statute deeming contractual provisions limiting time to sue to less than two years 
unenforceable is not applicable to a Mexican insurance contract issued in Mexico to a Mexican resident, covering 
tugboats in specified Mexican waters). Accord Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 823 (1985).   
54.  See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 303 (1981). “In effect, the Hague decision seems to 
suggest that the Court will not involve itself in the choice-of-law process so long as the forum has the most 
minimal contacts that might support the application of the lex fori.” HAY ET AL., supra note 41, § 3.26, at 192.   
55.  U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. 
56.  See, e.g., Bradford Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145 (1932) (compelling New Hampshire to 
recognize a Vermont worker-compensation statute (precluding common-law remedies) rather than entertaining a 
negligence action under New Hampshire law when employer-employee relationship formed in Vermont). 
57.  In Alaska Packers Ass’n v. Indus. Accident Comm’n, 294 U.S. 532, 547 (1935), the Court noted,  
A rigid and literal enforcement of the full faith and credit clause, without regard to the statute of the 
forum, would lead to the absurd result that, wherever the conflict arises, the statute of each state must 
be enforced in the courts of the other, but cannot be in its own. Unless by force of that clause a greater 
effect is thus to be given to a state statute abroad than the clause permits it to have at home, it is 
unavoidable that this Court determine for itself the extent to which the statute of one state may qualify 
or deny rights asserted under the statute of another. 
Id. 
58.  Id. at 550 (permitting the application of California’s worker compensation law rather than Alaska’s 
when employment relationship formed in California for work in Alaska, despite the parties’ contractual agreement 
that Alaska law governed). 
59.  Pac. Employers Ins. Co. v. Indus. Accident Comm’n, 306 U.S. 493, 502–03 (1939) (allowing 
application of forum (state-of-injury) law rather than the law of the state where employer-employee relationship 
formed). See also Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S. 408, 410 (1955) (acknowledging Pacific Employers’ departure from 
Bradford Electric). A state may not, however, simply refuse to entertain an action based on a sister-state’s law 
simply because the forum’s law does not support the action. See Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609, 612–13 (1951) 
(compelling Wisconsin to recognize a claim between Wisconsin residents under Illinois’s wrongful-death statute 
for death occurring in Illinois even though the Wisconsin wrongful-death statute applied only to in-state deaths).   
60.  Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 320 (1981). Justice Stevens continued to analyze separately 
but concurred in the judgment.   
61.  Id. at 313. 
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may choose to apply a law to an issue unless the party opposing its application can 
show that the choice is arbitrary or fundamentally unfair. That standard, apart from 
being amorphous, is also quite generous. In short, the Constitution controls very 
little in the choice-of-law arena, with the result that the laws of several states are 
constitutionally available to a court in choosing the law that governs an issue.62 
B. Non-Constitutional Choice of Law 
Choice of law in the United States has undergone great change. The originally 
dominant theory relied almost exclusively on territoriality. The law of the place 
where a tort happened (lex loci delicti) or where the parties entered into or were to 
perform a contract (lex loci contractus) governed.63  Those were the only contacts 
between a dispute and a state that mattered. That approach began to give way in 
the mid-twentieth century as state courts experimented with approaches other than 
territoriality for choosing an applicable law, considering things such as the “center 
of gravity” of a dispute or “grouping of contacts.”64 
In 1963, the watershed case of Babcock v. Jackson set off the American 
choice-of-law revolution in state courts by asking the question “[s]hall the 
law of the place of the tort invariably govern the availability of relief for 
the tort or shall the applicable choice of law rule also reflect a 
consideration of other factors which are relevant to the purposes served by 
the enforcement or denial of the remedy?” The Court of Appeals of New 
York, much to the delight of conflict of laws scholars, adopted what came 
to be known as the “most significant relationship” test.65 
The movement toward non-territorial approaches gained momentum, causing 
the American Law Institute to embark on a second attempt to restate the law of 
conflicts. That project began in 1952 but the Institute’s membership did not adopt 
the Restatement until 1971,66 a time span that reflects the complexity of the field. 
                                                                                                                                                 
62.  It is important to note that choice of law proceeds on an issue-by-issue basis; it is common for the laws 
of more than one government to govern various issues in a single case. See infra text accompanying notes 69–95.   
63.  See generally RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS, chs. 8, 9 (AM. LAW INST. 1934). See, e.g., Auten 
v. Auten, 124 N.E.2d 99, 101 (N.Y. 1954) (quoting Swift & Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 19 N.E.2d 992, 995 (N.Y. 
1939)). Most of the cases rely upon the generally accepted rules that “All matters bearing upon the execution, the 
interpretation and the validity of contracts . . . are determined by the law of the place where the contract is made,” 
while “all matters connected with its performance . . . are regulated by the law of the place where the contract, by 
its terms, is to be performed.” 
64.  See, e.g., Auten, 124 N.E.2d at 101–02.  
65.  David A. Moore, Hubbard v. Greeson: Indiana’s Misapplication of the Tort Sections of the Restatement 
(Second) of Conflict of Laws, 79 IND. L.J. 533, 534 (2004) (footnotes omitted) (citing Babcock v. Jackson, 191 
N.E.2d 279 (N.Y. 1963)). 
66.   Even then, it was what its Reporter Willis Reese called “a transitional document.” It offered both a 
substantial number of specific rules, which were typically described as presumptions, and a general methodology, 
the “most significant relationship” test. The “most significant relationship” test relied on seven factors which 
attempted to incorporate insights from several of the different developing schools of choice of law. Conflict of 
Laws, ALI ADVISER, http://www.thealiadviser.org/conflict-of-laws/ (last visited Aug. 3, 2018) [hereinafter ALI 
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It received a mixed reception; judges liked it, but many scholars did not.67 The 
Institute is now working on a Third Restatement, a project still in its early days.68 
It is beyond the scope of this Article to delve into the workings of conflicts 
theory today, but there is one concept common to all the post-territorial approaches 
that one must understand when evaluating Congress’s jurisdictional legislation. 
Dépeçage69 is almost invariably present, irrespective of a state’s approach to 
conflicts issues. The laws of more than one jurisdiction often apply in a single case. 
For example, New York distinguishes between conduct-regulating rules and loss 
allocating rules.70 The law of the place where the conduct occurs governs whether 
the conduct constitutes negligence, but whether the tortfeasor is liable or immune 
may depend on the law of some other jurisdiction.71 
Dépeçage in vertical choice-of-law cases dates at least from Swift v. Tyson.72 
Though Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins73 overruled Swift, under the 96-year Swift regime 
federal courts in diversity cases applied what the Supreme Court called “general 
                                                                                                                                                 
ADVISER] (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).   
67.  Id. (noting that the Second Restatement “has some significant failings”). One master of the subject 
noted that with its multifaceted general presumptions, methodology, and imprecise factors to consider, “[t]he 
Second Restatement is the most widely used alternative to the traditional approach, although this may be only 
because it is so amorphous that courts commit themselves to nothing by adopting it.” LARRY KRAMER, 
TEACHER’S MANUAL TO ACCOMPANY CONFLICT OF LAWS: CASES—COMMENTS—QUESTIONS 89 (6th ed. 2001). 
68.  ALI ADVISER, supra note 66. 
69.  The French term “dismemberment” is defined as “[a] court’s application of different state laws to 
different issues in a legal dispute; choice of law on an issue-by-issue basis.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 469–70 
(8th ed. 2004). The term applies equally well to an admixture of state and federal law. See SYMEON SYMEONIDES, 
WENDY COLLINS PERDUE & ARTHUR T. VON MEHREN, CONFLICT OF LAWS: AMERICAN, COMPARATIVE, 
INTERNATIONAL 259 (2d ed. 2003). 
70.  See generally HAY ET. AL., supra note 41, §§ 17.36–17.38, at 874–84.   
71.  See, e.g., Schultz v. Boy Scouts of Am., 480 N.E.2d 679 (1985) (tortious acts committed in New York, 
but New Jersey law of charitable immunity prevented recovery when all parties were citizens of that state). 
[T]he relative interests of the domicile and locus jurisdictions in having their laws apply will depend 
on the particular tort issue in conflict in the case. Thus, when the conflicting rules involve the 
appropriate standards of conduct, rules of the road, for example, the law of the place of the tort “will 
usually have a predominant, if not exclusive, concern” . . . because the locus jurisdiction’s interests in 
protecting the reasonable expectations of the parties who relied on it to govern their primary conduct 
and in the admonitory effect that applying its law will have on similar conduct in the future assume 
critical importance and outweigh any interests of the common-domicile jurisdiction . . . Conversely, 
when the jurisdictions’ conflicting rules relate to allocating losses that result from admittedly tortious 
conduct, as they do here, rules such as those limiting damages in wrongful death actions, vicarious 
liability rules, or immunities from suit, considerations of the State’s admonitory interest and party 
reliance are less important.  Under those circumstances, the locus jurisdiction has at best a minimal 
interest in determining the right of recovery or the extent of the remedy in an action by a foreign 
domiciliary for injuries resulting from the conduct of a codomiciliary that was tortious under the laws 
of both jurisdictions . . . Analysis then favors the jurisdiction of common domicile because of its 
interest in enforcing the decisions of both parties to accept both the benefits and the burdens of 
identifying with that jurisdiction and to submit themselves to its authority.   
Id. at 95–96 (citations omitted) (quoting Babcock v. Jackson, 191 N.E.2d 279, 287 (N.Y. 1963) citing 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145 cmt. d, at 417–18, and § 146 cmts. d, e, at 431–33 (AM. 
LAW INST. 1969)). 
72.  41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842). 
73.  304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
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law” to the rights and duties of the parties, but applied state procedural law, 
originally because of the Process Act of 1789’s command74 and later because of 
the Conformity Act of 1872.75 That was dépeçage. When Erie came along, 
dépeçage continued, but with roles reversed:  ordinarily, in most diversity cases, 
state law governed the rights and duties of the parties.76 
This is true generally, but certainly not invariably, and this is where some of 
the oversimplification inherent in the Conflicts Fallacy occurs. Even some 
extraordinarily knowledgeable witnesses before Congress have succumbed. For 
example, District Judge Elmo B. Hunter, a particularly distinguished jurist, 
testified in Congress, “These cases involve solely matters of State law and State 
subjects.”77 That may simply be a shorthand description of the general case for 
                                                                                                                                                 
74.  See Process Act of 1789, ch. 21, § 2, 1 Stat. 93, 93 (federal procedure to “be the same in each state 
respectively as are now used or allowed in the supreme courts of the same”). 
75.  See Conformity Act of 1872, ch. 255, §5, 17 Stat. 196, 197 (1872) (federal procedure to “conform, as 
near as may be, to the practice, pleadings, and forms and modes of proceeding existing at the time in like causes 
in the courts of record of the State within which such circuit or district courts are held, any rule of court to the 
contrary notwithstanding”).   
         76.   Nonetheless, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure govern almost all aspects of shepherding the cases 
through the federal judicial system.  Imagine being a law student returning for the second year of study in the fall 
of 1938 after that tectonic shift came along! 
77.  See, e.g., Court Reform and Access to Justice Act, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil 
Liberties, and the Admin. of Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong., at 4–5 (1987) (statement of 
Hon. Elmo B. Hunter) [hereinafter HSubcommCCLAJud100]). See also COURT REFORM AND ACCESS TO 
JUSTICE ACT OF 1988, H.R. REP. NO. 100–899, pt. 1, at 44 (1988). 
 For example, Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964), was a contract dispute between 
an arm of the Cuban government and a private individual. It was a diversity case and would turn on the act-of-
state doctrine: “[T]he courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another, 
done within its own territory.” Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250 (1897). The Cuban government had 
expropriated a sugar crop and refused to release it until the buyer signed a new contract with the bank. Both 
contracts had been negotiated and signed in New York. The central issue was whether the Cuban government had 
seized the existing New York contract rights or the sugar crop that was in Cuba. The Supreme Court ruled that 
the seizure had occurred in Cuba and applied the act-of-state doctrine—a federal doctrine—to the clearly 
substantive-law question of whether the Cuban seizure was lawful or unlawful. Unlawful seizure would have 
been a complete defense, but the act-of-state doctrine prevented that. The Court justified its decision on the ground 
that the case involved foreign relations, which are a dominant federal interest. The federal rule thus ousted the 
New York law that might otherwise have applied. See also Boyle v. United Tech. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 513 (1988) 
(preventing recovery on a state wrongful death claim by applying a federal common-law immunity for 
government contractors). 
 There are two issues lurking in these kinds of cases. The first is whether federal or state law should apply 
to a particular issue. Where there is federal law—including federal common law—it applies because of 
supremacy. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. The second question is whether state or federal courts should adjudicate 
such cases. Abolishing diversity jurisdiction, see supra text accompanying note 40, would send cases like Banco 
Nacional and Boyle to the state courts in the first instance. When there is extant federal law, that is not a problem; 
the Supremacy Clause requires state courts to honor federal law’s precedence. Where there is no federal law, 
however, and there are recognizable federal interests bearing on an issue, protection of which might require 
federal common law, what should a state court do? There appear to be two choices: (1) the state court can try to 
anticipate whether a federal court would create a common-law rule and then try to anticipate what the rule would 
be and how to apply it, or (2) the state court can simply apply state law to the critical issue. Either may fail to 
accord proper weight to the federal interests. Thus, one unintended but practical consequence of abolishing 
diversity jurisdiction would be to put additional pressure on the Supreme Court to review such cases. That is not 
necessarily bad, but the oversimplification of viewing state claims never involving federal issues prevents one 
from even perceiving the problem. As Robert Heinlein so memorably said, “TANSTAAFL” (an acronym for 
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convenience of brevity. That is all well and good for those who grasp the nuances 
of Conflicts, but many do not—perhaps including many Members of Congress 
who will vote for or against jurisdiction-modifying statutes.  
Accordingly, it is a grave mistake to speak simply of “state cases” or “federal 
cases.” As the American Law Institute has recognized, “The transaction or event 
that has connections to only one jurisdiction is now a rarity. Allocating authority 
among different state and national sovereigns in a sensible and predictable way is 
more important than ever. Yet sadly, our legal system is increasingly poorly 
equipped to do so.”78 And therein lies the problem; courts decide many cases using 
the law of more than one jurisdiction. Even what seem like garden-variety tort 
cases often involve federal law, as the Supreme Court recognized in a 2005 federal-
question jurisdiction case.79 A consumer suffers injury from an impure or 
improperly labeled food or drug; the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 193880 may 
govern some of the issues in the resulting litigation, particularly whether there has 
been misbranding or mislabeling, predicates for negligence per se.  Similarly, the 
persons suffering injuries in a car accident may seek recovery for negligence 
against the manufacturer, alleging that the vehicles did not comply with federal 
safety standards under the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 196681 
or the Highway Safety Act of 1966.82 That is dépeçage.83 
Nor are contracts—ordinarily thought of as state-law matters—exempt from 
the influence of federal law, as the Cuban-sugar-expropriation case shows.84 The 
Truth-in-Lending Act85 regulates how commercial lenders conduct their 
businesses; violation of the Act may be a defense to an action to collect the loan.86  
The Supreme Court has interpreted the Federal Arbitration Act87 to invalidate 
contract provisions that it feels are inconsistent with federal arbitration policy, 
even if state contract law permits such provisions.88 And that is dépeçage. 
                                                                                                                                                 
“There ain’t no such thing as a free lunch.”). ROBERT HEINLEIN, THE MOON IS A HARSH MISTRESS 91 (1966), 
available at https://ia601600.us.archive.org/12/items/TheMoonIsAHarshMistress_201701/TheMoonIsAHarshM 
istress.pdf (last visited Sept. 17, 2018) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). See also 
HSubcommCCLAJud100, supra note 77, at 275 (statement of Stephen J. Markman, Assistant Attorney General). 
78.  ALI ADVISER, supra note 66.   
79.  See Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc v. Darue Engineering & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 318 (2005) (“The 
violation of federal statutes and regulations is commonly given negligence per se effect in state tort proceedings.”) 
(quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 14 cmt. a, at 195 (Tent. Draft No. 1, AM. LAW INST., 2001)). 
80.  Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1050, codified as amended, 
21 U.S.C. §§ 301–399d (2012). 
81.  Pub. L. No. 89-563, 80 Stat. 718 (1966) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1381–1431 (2012)). 
82.  Pub. L. No. 93-87, 87 Stat. 290 (1966) (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. §§ 101–80504 (2012)). 
83.  See Diversity of Citizenship Jurisdiction/Magistrates Reform—1979: Before the Subcomm. on Courts, 
Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong. 26 (1979) 
[hereinafter HSubcommCCLJud96] (statement of Daniel J. Meador, Assistant Attorney General). 
84.  See supra text accompanying note 77. 
85.  Truth in Lending Act, Pub. L. No. 90-321, 82 Stat. 146 (1968) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 
1601–65 (2012)). 
86.  See, e.g., Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455, 457 (1981).   
87.  9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2012). 
88.  See, e.g., AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 343 (2011) (finding the Federal 
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By the same token, actions arising under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal-question-
jurisdiction), including actions where federal law creates the plaintiff’s cause of 
action, often contain issues of state law. Wilson v. Garcia89 held that state statutes 
of limitation apply in actions under the Civil Rights Act of 1871,90 but when such 
actions accrue is a question of federal law.91 In Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust 
Co.,92 the plaintiff-shareholder sought to enjoin a state corporation’s investment in 
federal bonds, claiming that the bonds were unconstitutional. Federal law 
obviously would determine the constitutional question, but Smith’s rights as a 
shareholder and the corporation’s power to purchase securities depended entirely 
on Missouri law because the defendant was a Missouri corporation. And that is 
dépeçage. 
Characterizing cases as “state cases” or “federal cases” simply will not do. The 
meaning of those terms is not clear. Depending on the speaker, the terms may refer 
to cases in which state or federal law creates the plaintiff’s cause of action, but 
they also may refer to the judicial system trying the case. Worse, even if the 
speaker intends to refer to the law that creates the cause of action, that obscures 
the entire dépeçage process. It paints a false, monochromatic picture of a 
technicolor landscape, preventing meaningful discussion. Some Members of 
Congress (and witnesses) have asserted that federal courts should decide questions 
of federal law, and state courts should decide questions of state law.93 That sounds 
plausible, provided one reads it quickly enough, but it ignores the vast number of 
cases that have both federal and state issues of law. It connotes that the courts of 
the jurisdiction creating potentially applicable law should interpret and apply that 
law—even if that would require several states’ courts (or state and federal courts) 
to participate in adjudicating a single case.  
                                                                                                                                                 
Arbitration Act preempts the California common-law rule that class-action waivers in contracts of adhesion are 
unconscionable).   
89.  471 U.S. 261 (1985).   
90.  Ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (1871) (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985–1986 (2012)). 
91.  See, e.g., Ruiz-Sulsona v. Univ. of Puerto Rico, 334 F.3d 157, 159 (1st Cir. 2003). 
92.  255 U.S. 180 (1921). 
93.  See, e.g., HSubcommCCLJud96, supra note 83, at 23 (statement of Hon. Elmo B. Hunter) (“The 
guiding principle is that there should be Federal court jurisdiction where Federal questions are at stake, and State 
court jurisdiction where State questions are at stake and State courts are available to provide an adequate forum.”); 
Jurisdictional Amendments Act of 1979, S. 679, Hearings Before the S. Committee on the Judiciary, 96th Cong. 
at 21 (1979) [hereinafter SCommJud96] (statement of Daniel J. Meador, Assistant Attorney General) (“[T]he 
guiding principle on this question of allocation of judicial business is simply this, that generally speaking, State 
law matters belong in the State courts, and Federal law matters belong in the Federal courts. To paraphrase an 
ancient statement from high authority, ‘We should render unto the State that which is State, and unto the Federal 
that which is Federal.’”). That sentiment sounds good and logical, but it begs the quite complex questions of what 
matters are state matters, what matters are federal matters, and most important, precisely what it is that makes 
them one or the other. See also id. at 51 (statement of Senator Howard F. Metzenbaum, Member, Committee on 
the Judiciary); id. at 55 (statement of Charles Wiggins); H.R. REP. NO. 108–144, at 26 (2003), as reprinted in 
2003 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1–175 (“Federal courts must apply State substantive law in diversity cases.”). Boyle v. United 
Tech. Corp., 487 U.S. 500 (1988), and Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964), belie that 
confident, but erroneous, statement. 
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It is sometimes asserted that diversity cases only involve State issues and 
that Federal judges should not have to pass on State law. With deference 
to some very distinguished people who have come forward with this thesis, 
I believe that view is too simplistic. We have a complex government with 
dual principles of substantive law and procedural rules and court systems. 
Federal judges often have to apply State law in a Federal case. Take the 
Consumer Product Safety Act that is partially dealt with in two of the bills 
that are now before you. That law recognizes and it is not unusual in its 
approach-that any State law that has been overlaid by the Federal statute 
can still be invoked and in the Federal courts. It is not unusual to have a 
suit that involves both Federal issues and State issues. Thus a case that 
might otherwise involve only State issues, will turn on an affirmative 
defense that is wholly Federal, such as a plea of res judicata involving full 
faith and credit, discharge in bankruptcy, or a Federal statute, such as the 
Hepburn Act, which regulates the giving of free railroad passage . . . It 
seems to me that it is too simplistic to come forward with the idea that 
diversity cases are always going to involve just State issues and that 
Federal cases are always going to involve only Federal issues. 94 
The assumption that a single jurisdiction’s law governs all of the issues in a case 
is the Conflicts Fallacy, and it represents a violation of a “quotation” many 
erroneously attribute to Albert Einstein: everything should be made as simple as 
possible, but not simpler.95 The Conflicts Fallacy oversimplifies a complex set of 
problems. Against that backdrop, it is appropriate now to focus on federal 
jurisdictional statutes and congressional consideration of them. 
III. THE JURISDICTION STATUTES UNDERLYING MOST FEDERAL LITIGATION 
A. Federal-Question Jurisdiction (28 U.S.C. § 1331) 
Except for its tumultuous false start in 1801–1802,96 federal-question 
jurisdiction has enjoyed a tame history in Congress. It began as part of a new statute 
that set out all the bases for subject-matter jurisdiction of the federal circuit 
courts.97  The description of basic federal-question jurisdiction was simple: 
                                                                                                                                                 
94.  See Federal Diversity of Citizenship Jurisdiction Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Improvements 
in Judicial Machinery of the S. Committee on the Judiciary, 95th Cong. 133–34 (1978) [hereinafter 
SSubcommJMJud95] (statement of Prof. James W. Moore).  
95.  There is no evidence that Einstein actually said this, but he did express a similar thought: “It is essential 
for our point of view that we can arrive at these constructions and the laws relating them one with another by 
adhering to the principle of searching for the mathematically simplest concepts and their connections.” Albert 
Einstein, On the Method of Theoretical Physics, The Herbert Spencer Lecture Delivered at Oxford University 
(June 10, 1933), in, I PHILOSOPHY OF SCI., No. 2, at 168 (Univ. of Chi. Press, 1933). 
96.  See supra note 9. 
97.  The federal judicial structure has evolved since the early days. Congress originally created two levels 
of federal trial courts, known as the circuit courts and the district courts. The district court handled small cases. 
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[T]he circuit courts of the United States shall have original cognizance, 
concurrent with the courts of the several States, of all suits of a civil nature 
at common law or in equity, where the matter in dispute exceeds, exclusive 
of costs, the sum or value of five hundred dollars, and arising under the 
Constitution or laws of the United States, or treaties made, or which shall 
be made, under their authority. . . .98 
There is no significant legislative history—no hearings, no committee reports, 
and no mention in the Congressional Record save the one sentence from the 
president pro tem of the Senate asserting that Congress intended statutory federal-
question jurisdiction to be coextensive with the constitutional description,99 to 
which Chief Justice Marshall had given broad construction in Osborn v. Bank of 
the United States.100 
Congress has recodified federal-question jurisdiction since 1875, but the only 
substantive change came in 1980.101 For 105 years, the federal-question statute had 
a jurisdictional-amount floor, which tracked the amount required for diversity 
jurisdiction.102 Congress eliminated the amount-in-controversy requirement103 for 
three reasons. First, the courts spent considerable time attempting to assign value 
in cases seeking equitable relief.104 Second, Congress became uncomfortable with 
implicitly saying to some suitors that their federal rights were not valuable enough 
                                                                                                                                                 
The circuit courts had both original jurisdiction and appellate jurisdiction over district-court decisions. Appeals 
from the circuit courts, whether their jurisdiction was original or appellate, ran to the Supreme Court. In 1891, 
the Evarts Act, Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826, created the three-tier structure in effect today. See 
generally ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 1.4, at 20–33 (5th ed. 2007). 
98.  Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470, 470.   
99.  See supra note 15. 
100.  22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).   
101.  There have been proposals from time to time to allow removal of cases if the defendant raises a federal 
defense or files a federal counterclaim. See infra note 146.  None have survived the legislative process.   
102.  See infra text accompanying notes 115–118.   
103.  Federal Question Jurisdictional Amendments Act of 1980, Pub. L. 96-486, § 2(a), 94 Stat. 2369 
(1980) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2012)). As Dean Chemerinsky has pointed out, removing the 
requirement effectively made several other statutes, which conferred original jurisdiction on the district courts 
without any amount-in-controversy requirement, superfluous. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 97, § 5.1, at 267.   
104.  See Diversity of Citizenship Jurisdiction/Magistrates Reform, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on 
Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the H. Comm. the Judiciary, 95th Cong. 258 (1977) 
[hereinafter HSubcommCCLJud95] (statement of Rep. Robert F. Drinan, Member, House Committee on the 
Judiciary)  
I am very pleased that this proposal to eliminate the $10,000 limitation in Federal question cases has 
the approval of the Judicial Conference of the United States, the American Law Institute, the 
Department of Justice, and the public interest lawyers. It might be an amendment we should have 
enacted 20 years ago 
See also, e.g., Administrative Procedure, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Law and Governmental 
Relations of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong. 46 (1975) (statement of Robert A. Anthony, Chairman, 
Administrative Conference of the United States); H.R. REP. 96-1461, at 2 (1980); H.R. REP. NO. 95-893, at 25 
(1978) (letter of Erwin N. Griswold to Rep. Robert W. Kastenmeier); SCommJud96, supra note 93, at 177 
(statement of Prof. Alan B. Morrison); id. at 306 (letter of Prof. Kenneth L. Karst to Rep. Robert W. Kastenmeier); 
ABOLITION OF DIVERSITY OF CITIZENSHIP JURISDICTION, H. REP. NO. 95-893, at 302 (1978) (letter of Erwin N. 
Griswold); S. REP. NO. 96-827, at 1, 3–5 (1980). 
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to qualify for federal adjudication.105 Third, Congress received assurances from 
many knowledgeable sources that the effect on the federal docket would be 
minimal.106 
Apart from the disappearance of the amount-in-controversy requirement, 
today’s federal-question statute reads remarkably like its 1875 ancestor: “The 
district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the 
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.”107 The wording is simple. The 
Supreme Court’s interpretations of it have been anything but simple, particularly 
since 1986.108 
B. Diversity and Alienage Jurisdiction (28 U.S.C. § 1332) 
Diversity jurisdiction has a much more exciting history than federal-question 
jurisdiction. There is rampant speculation about why the Framers included 
diversity jurisdiction in the Constitution and why the first Congress granted it in 
                                                                                                                                                 
105.  See, e.g., HSubcommCCLJud95, supra note 104, at 165 (1977) (statement of Hon. Edward T. 
Gignoux); id. at 229 (prepared statement and testimony of Prof. Charles Alan Wright), id. at 247 (statement of 
Rep. Robert W. Kastenmeier, Chairman, Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice 
of the House Committee on the Judiciary); id. at 263–64 (1977) (statement of Prof. Lucas A. Powe, Jr.); CONG. 
REC. 29787 (Nov. 17, 1980) (statement of Rep. Robert W. Kastenmeier); H.R. REP. 96-1461, at 1–2, as reprinted 
in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5063–64; ABOLITION OF DIVERSITY OF CITIZENSHIP JURISDICTION, H. REP. NO. 95-893, at 
282 (1978); FEDERAL QUESTION JURISDICTIONAL AMENDMENTS ACT OF 1980, S. REP. NO. 96-827, at 3 (1980). 
106.  See, e.g., SCommJud96, supra note 93, at 52 (statement of Senator Howard F. Metzenbaum, Member, 
Senate Committee on the Judiciary) (“There is no valid reason for retaining the amount in controversy requirement 
in any Federal question case. Elimination of this requirement will result in only a slight increase in the number of 
suits in Federal courts and will give every citizen the right to litigate his or her Federal claims before a Federal 
tribunal.”). 
The likelihood that any increase in Federal caseloads resulting from the elimination of the 
jurisdictional amount will be slight is reinforced by an examination of the effects of the 1958 change 
in the jurisdictional amount. In that year the jurisdictional amount was increased from $3,000 to 
$10,000 for both diversity and Federal question cases. With respect to diversity cases, the change had 
the apparent effect of decreasing filings the following year by over 30 percent. On the other hand, 
Federal question filings decreased by less than 1 percent. We conclude from this that the number of 
Federal question cases affected by the jurisdictional amount in 28 U.S.C. § 1331 would be few. As to 
those few cases, we believe there should be no price on entrance to the Federal courts for a case that  
arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. 
Id. at 32 (statement of Daniel J. Meador, Assistant Attorney General). See also id. at 108 (statement of 
Congressman M. Caldwell Butler); id. at 153 (statement of Prof. Herbert Wechsler); CONG. REC. 29787 (Nov. 17, 
1980) (statement of Rep. Robert W. Kastenmeier); H.R. REP. 96-1461, at 2, as reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
5063 (1980); H.R. REP. NO. 95-893, at 18 (1978) (letter from Prof. Charles Alan Wright to Rep. Robert W. 
Kastenmeier); HSubcommCCLJud96, supra note 83, at 137 (testimony of Daniel J. Meador, Assistant Attorney 
General); id. at 209 (testimony of Prof. Charles Alan Wright). See, e.g., HSubcommCCLJud95, supra note 104, 
at 272–73 (colloquy between Rep. George E. Danielson, Member, House Committee on the Judiciary, and John 
F. Spaniol, Jr., Assistant Director, Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts); ABOLITION OF DIVERSITY OF 
CITIZENSHIP JURISDICTION, H. REP. NO. 95-893, at 282 (1978). But see SSubcommJMJud95, supra note 94 
(statement of the Defense Research Institute, predicting a large increase in complex class-action cases); S. REP. 
NO. 96-827, at 2, 5 (1980). But see id. at 10–11 (minority views of Senators Thurmond, Laxalt, and Dole). 
107.  28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2012). 
108.  See supra text accompanying notes 9–14.   
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the Judiciary Act of 1789, but there is virtually no hard evidence.109 “The greatest 
mystery, and the most heated controversy, surrounds the diversity jurisdiction . . . 
[T]here is to this day no consensus as to the historical justification or the 
contemporary need for diversity jurisdiction, though it was accepted without 
question at the Constitutional Convention.”110 
That situation has given rise to numerous proposals over many years to 
curtail111 or eliminate diversity jurisdiction.112 Other than periodically raising the 
amount-in-controversy requirement,113 Congress has enacted only one.114 The 
congressional grant of diversity jurisdiction has undergone more changes than the 
grant of federal-question jurisdiction, but apart from the modernization of its 
language, the statute’s requirements have changed in a limited number of ways. 
One recurrent change increases the required amount in controversy. Congress 
began at $500,115 and from time to time has increased it, first to $2,000,116 then 
$3,000,117 and subsequently $10,000,118 $50,000,119 and $75,000,120 where it stands 
today. It is by no means clear that raising the jurisdictional amount has ever had 
any significant effect on the federal dockets. Because of inflation, higher dollar 
amounts may not reflect significant change in underlying claim value. Finally, 
plaintiffs can often, particularly in tort cases, to plead as much as necessary to 
qualify, and Congress has heard testimony to that effect.121 
                                                                                                                                                 
109.  For an excellent overview of the history of diversity jurisdiction and the arguments for and against it, 
see WRIGHT & KANE, supra note 34, §§ 1, 23, at 3, 143–53. See also Appendix, Part A. 
110.  WRIGHT & KANE, supra note 34, § 1, at 3. But see, e.g., SCommJud96, supra note 93, at 145 (1979) 
(statement of Prof. Herbert Wechsler) (“I think there is no question that the fear of prejudice against the out-of-
stater was the historic reason that led the First Congress to take up the option that article III confers.”). 
111.  For example, Congress has heard multiple witnesses and organizations suggest barring plaintiffs from 
filing diversity actions in their own states. See infra note 123. 
112.  See supra text accompanying note 40. See, e.g., Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1979, Hearings 
Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Jud. Machinery of the S. Committee on the Judiciary, 96th Cong. 165–
66 (1979) [hereinafter SSubcommIJMJud96] (statement of Hon. Henry J. Friendly); James William Moore & 
Donald T. Weckstein, Diversity Jurisdiction: Past, Present, and Future, 43 TEX. L. REV. 1, 14 & n.89 (1964) 
(gathering examples). There appears to be general agreement that even if Congress were to eliminate most 
diversity jurisdiction, it should retain the Federal Interpleader Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1335 (2012), and should create 
some sort of way to get mass tort cases into the federal courts. See Appendix, Part H. The Class Action Fairness 
Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005) (codified in scattered sections of Title 28 of the U.S. Code) 
[hereinafter CAFA], helps to address the latter concern provided that someone files a class action and that the 
matter exceeds $5,000,000 in controversy. See infra note 128. 
113.  See infra text accompanying notes 115–120. 
114.  See infra text accompanying notes 133–136. 
115.  Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, §§ 11–12, 1 Stat. 73, 78. 
116.  Act of Mar. 3, 1887, ch. 373, § 1, 24 Stat. 552, 552; Act of Aug. 13, 1888, ch. 866, § 1, 25 Stat. 433, 
434. 
117.  Judiciary Act of Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 24, 36 Stat. 1087, 1091. 
118.  Act of July 25, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-554, 72 Stat. 415, 415. 
119.  Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-702, § 201, 102 Stat. 4642, 
4646. 
120.  Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-317, § 205(a), 110 Stat. 3847, 3850. 
121.  See, e.g., HSubcommCCLJud96, supra note 83, at 36 (statement of Daniel J. Meador, Assistant 
Attorney General); HSubcommCCLJud95, supra note 104, at 194 (colloquy between Representative Robert F. 
Drinan and Daniel J. Meador, Assistant Attorney General); Jurisdiction of Federal Courts Concerning Diversity 
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The Judiciary Act of 1789, in addition to requiring that more than $500 be in 
controversy, required that one of the parties be a citizen of the forum state, though 
that limitation did not apply in alienage cases.122 Ironically, one of the oft-
suggested (but never enacted) modern proposals to limit diversity jurisdiction 
would prohibit an in-state plaintiff from invoking diversity jurisdiction.123 Until 
1940, the District of Columbia and the various United States territories were not 
states for diversity purposes. In 1940, Congress explicitly allowed the federal 
courts to exercise jurisdiction between citizens of a state and citizens of those other 
enumerated areas.124 Beginning in 1948, Congress has defined “states” to include 
the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and United States territories.125 
Binary cases—cases with one plaintiff and one defendant—are 
straightforward, but there is an important additional requirement for cases with 
more parties. Early on, the Court announced the rule of complete diversity: cases 
with a plaintiff and a defendant from the same state do not satisfy the diversity 
statute.126 Chief Justice Marshall made clear that he was construing the statute,127 
not the corresponding constitutional language, and the complete-diversity rule 
remains in place today.128 Co-citizenship among plaintiffs or among defendants 
does not prevent diversity jurisdiction, but even one shared citizenship between 
opposing plaintiffs and defendants dooms it.129 
                                                                                                                                                 
of Citizenship, Hearing Before Subcomm. No. 3 of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 85th Cong. 5 (1957) 
[hereinafter HSComm3Jud85] (statement of Representative William M. Tuck, Member, House Committee on the 
Judiciary); id. at 30–31, 33 (testimony of Hon. Albert B. Maris, Chairman, Comm. on Revision of the Laws of 
the Judicial Conf. of the United States); HSubcommCCLAJud100, supra note 77, at 101 (statement of Hon. Elmo 
B. Hunter, Jud. Conf. of the U.S.); HSubcommCCLAJud100, supra note 77, at 313 (statement of Hon. Abner J. 
Mikva). 
122.  Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 78.   
123.  See, e.g., SSubcommJMJud95, supra note 94, at 16 (testimony of Rep. Robert W. Kastenmeier); id. 
at 73 (statement of Daniel J. Meador, Assistant Attorney General); id. at 81 (statement of Erwin N. Griswold, 
American College of Trial Lawyers); HSubcommCCLJud96, supra note 83, at 85 (colloquy between Rep. Tom 
Railsback, Member, Committee on the Judiciary and Prof. Thomas D. Rowe, Jr.); HSubcommCCLAJud100, 
supra note 77, at 26 (prepared statement of Hon. Elmo B. Hunter, Judicial Conference of the U.S.); id. at 107 
(statement of Hon. Elmo B. Hunter, Judicial Conference of the U.S.); id. at 321, 331 (statement of Hon. Patrick 
Higginbotham); COURT REFORM AND ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT OF 1988, H.R. REP. NO. 100-899, pt. 1, at 760 
(1988) (letter from Thomas M. Boyd, Acting Assistant Attorney General, to Senator Howell Heflin, Chairman, 
Subcommittee on Courts and Administrative Practice of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary).   
124.  Act of Apr. 20, 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-463, 54 Stat. 143. 
125.  Act of July 25, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-554, 72 Stat. 415, 415 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1332(e) 
(2012)). 
126.  Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806). 
127.  Id. 
128.  Because the Constitution does not require complete diversity, State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 
386 U.S. 523, 530–31 (1967), Congress can provide for so-called minimal diversity (diversity between any two 
parties) and has in two notable instances. First, the Federal Interpleader Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1335 (2012), confers 
jurisdiction on the district courts if any two claimants are diverse. Second, CAFA amended the diversity statute 
to permit class actions based on minimal diversity if more than $5,000,000 is in controversy and “any member of 
a class of plaintiffs is a citizen of a State different from any defendant,” Miss. ex rel. Hood v. AU Optronics Corp., 
571 U.S. 161, 165 (2014) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2)(A)). See infra note 151.  
129.  The rule thus makes party alignment critical and affects litigators’ tactics. Congress recognized this 
in 1789, prohibiting diversity jurisdiction in cases involving assigned promissory notes unless the assignor’s 
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Corporations are a continuing problem in diversity litigation.130 The Supreme 
Court originally said that corporations had no citizenship but rather took on the 
citizenships of their members,131 but thirty-five years later the Court declared that 
corporations were citizens of the states that chartered them.132 For diversity 
purposes, corporations have remained so ever since. In 1958, Congress conferred 
a second diversity citizenship on some corporations, making them also citizens of 
the states in which they have their “principal place of business.”133 Congress did 
so to limit diversity filings, especially in cases where a corporation was effectively 
a local business that merely received its charter from another state.134 This created 
a glaring anomaly when the opposing party was also from the state where the 
foreign corporation operated.135 Many businesses incorporate in Delaware for a 
variety of reasons.136 The effect on diversity jurisdiction was that for Delaware 
                                                                                                                                                 
citizenship would have permitted diversity jurisdiction. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 79. In 
1875, Congress forbade diversity jurisdiction where “the parties to said suit have been improperly or collusively 
made or joined, either as plaintiffs or defendants, for the purpose of creating a case cognizable or removable under 
this chapter. . . .” Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 5, 18 Stat. 470, 472 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1359 (2012)). 
The converse is not true; there is no formal prohibition of joining parties to make diversity jurisdiction 
unavailable, though party realignment is sometimes possible. See WRIGHT & KANE, supra note 34, §§ 30–31, at 
177–90.   
130.  See, Felix Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial Power Between United States and State Courts, 13 
CORN. L. R. 499, 523 (1928) (“Corporate litigation . . .  is the key to diversity problems. For legal metaphysics 
about corporate “citizenship” has produced a brood of incoherent legal fictions concerning the status of a 
corporation, defeated the domestic policies of states, and heavily encumbered the federal courts with controversies 
which, in any fair distribution of political power between the central government and the states, do not belong to 
the national courts.”). 
131.  Bank of the U.S. v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61 (1809). 
132.  Louisville, C. & C.R. Co. v. Letson, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 497 (1844). Professors Wright and Kane note 
that the Court subsequently changed its rationale while retaining the Letson result by borrowing Deveaux’s 
citizenship approach but conclusively presuming that all shareholders of the corporation to be citizens of the 
chartering state. See WRIGHT & KANE, supra note 34, § 27, at 166. What that accomplished is not clear.   
133.  Act of Jul. 25, 1958, § 2, 72 Stat. 415, 415 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) (2012)). Congress 
heard testimony from some of its own members suggesting removing corporations’ eligibility for diversity 
jurisdiction. See, HSComm3Jud85, supra note 121, at 4 (statement of Representative William M. Tuck, Member, 
House Committee on the Judiciary); JURISDICTION OF FEDERAL COURTS IN DIVERSITY OF CITIZENSHIP AND 
FEDERAL QUESTION CASES; PROHIBITING THE REMOVAL TO DISTRICT COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES OF 
ACTIONS COMMENCED IN STATE COURTS UNDER STATE WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION LAWS, S. REP. NO. 1830, 
at 1, 2, 4–5, as reprinted in 1958 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3099–3136. Congress’s passage of the amendment curtailed, but 
did not eliminate corporate diversity jurisdiction. 
134.  See HSComm3Jud85, supra note 121, at 8 (statement of Rep. Thomas Ludlow Ashley); id. at 14 
(Report of the Committee on Jurisdiction and Venue, Judicial Conference of the United States); id. at 29 
(statement of Hon. Albert B. Maris, Chairman, Committee on Revision of the Laws of the Judicial Conference of 
the U.S.). 
135.  See CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, EDWARD H. COOPER, VIKRAM DAVID AMAR, 
RICHARD D. FREER, HELEN HERSHKOFF, JOAN E. STEINMAN & CATHERINE T. STRUVE, 13F FEDERAL PRACTICE 
& PROCEDURE JURISDICTION § 3624 (3d ed. 2017), available at 
https://1.next.westlaw.com/Document/I63007124dca911dd8276a3d243f3ed86/View/FullText.html?origination
Context=documenttoc&transitionType=CategoryPageItem&contextData=%28sc.Category%29 (last visited 
Nov. 2018); HSComm3Jud85, supra note 121, at 28 (1957) (testimony of Hon. Albert B. Maris, Chairman, 
Committee on Revision of the Laws of the Judicial Conference of the United States). 
136.  See, e.g., William J. Carney & George B. Shepherd, The Mystery of Delaware Law’s Continuing 
Success, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 3 (2009) (noting Delaware’s dominance in attracting corporations dating from 
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corporations, even if all of their operations were in a single other state, diversity 
jurisdiction existed for cases between the corporations and citizens of that state. 
Yet clearly, corporations with major business presences in various states are hardly 
“outsiders” that should worry about prejudice because of their Delaware 
citizenship. Congress’s introduction of corporate dual-state citizenship tended, 
therefore, to limit diversity jurisdiction when corporations were parties. 
That is a brief history of the two most important federal subject-matter-
jurisdiction statutes. The remaining question is whether their evolution reveals any 
reasonably sophisticated congressional “judgment about the sound division of 
labor between state and federal courts.”137 It does not. To be sure, there are some 
recurrent themes in congressional discussions about diversity jurisdiction since 
1875,138 but it is a leap of faith to argue that Congress spends much time thinking 
about what kinds of cases should be in federal courts (and why) as a determinant 
of jurisdictional policy, especially for federal-question jurisdiction. 
C. Congressional Intent—Themes 
Despite the absence of the grand plan to which the Supreme Court repeatedly 
adverts, Congress hears and talks about some consistent ideas when considering 
jurisdictional legislation.139 Some come from Members of Congress. Others are 
from judges, representatives of the Department of Justice, litigators, and the 
professoriate.140 But apart from the tautology that federal cases (or questions of 
federal law) belong in federal courts, and state cases (or questions of state law) 
belong in state courts, there is no evidence to support the Court’s musings. (The 
Court should get limited credit for not articulating the Conflicts Fallacy141 that lies 
just under the tautology’s surface, but that provides no firm ground on which the 
Court can base its statements about of congressional intent.) Its assertions 
                                                                                                                                                 
1911).  
137.  Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc., 545 U.S. at 314. 
138.  See generally Appendix. 
139.  In two instances, the Court has discerned congressional jurisdictional intent from statutes having 
nothing to do with jurisdiction. See Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308 (2005) 
(Internal Revenue Code of 1954); Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804 (1986) (Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act of 1938). A more recent case speaks generally of “the federal-state balance approved by Congress,” 
but cites nothing to support the Court’s assertion that the jurisdictional result the Court reaches in that case is 
what Congress wanted. See Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251 (2013). I think of these cases as the crystal-ball cases. 
See infra text accompanying notes 159–231 for further discussion. 
140.  Nine areas receive repeated attention: (1) the historical basis for diversity jurisdiction, (2) the docket 
pressure that diversity jurisdiction generates in the federal courts, (3) concern about local prejudice against parties 
from other states, (4) the desirability of litigants having a choice of forum, (5) diversity jurisdiction as a “social 
service,” (6) differing jury pools in federal and state courts, (7) parity (or lack of parity) between state and federal 
courts, (8) how to handle mass-tort cases and cases involving parties from multiple states or nations, and (9) the 
desirability of retaining the Federal Interpleader Act, with its minimal diversity requirement, even if Congress 
were to eliminate or sharply curtail the remainder of diversity jurisdiction. Materials illustrating these themes 
appear in the Appendix. The materials are not exhaustive; the length would be prohibitive. They are, however, 
representative.   
141.  See supra text accompanying notes 41–95.   
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exemplify what then-Professor Frankfurter called, “the momentum of constant 
repetition.”142 The Court ignores what some know as Souder’s Law: “repetition 
does not establish validity.”143 
Most important, there are no themes with respect to federal-question 
jurisdiction; all relate to diversity.144 Congress almost never discussed federal-
question jurisdiction, and what little discussion there was focused almost 
exclusively on the amount-in-controversy requirement that Congress eliminated in 
1980145 and secondarily on whether Congress should allow removal when the 
defendant asserts a federal counterclaim or a federal defense.146 Congress has acted 
with respect to federal-question jurisdiction twice in the past forty years, once to 
eliminate the amount-in-controversy requirement and once to codify the judicially 
created doctrines of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction as “supplemental 
jurisdiction.”147 Eliminating the amount in controversy clearly expanded the 
federal-question jurisdiction docket to some degree.148 Whether supplemental 
jurisdiction expanded the docket149 or not is a matter of dispute among the 
                                                                                                                                                 
142.  Frankfurter, supra note 130, at 521.   
143.  See ARTHUR BLOCH, MURPHY’S LAW: THE 26TH ANNIVERSARY EDITION 72 (2003). 
144.  See generally Appendix. Appendix Part B, concerning docket pressure, could theoretically apply to 
federal-question jurisdiction, but none of the evidence suggests in any way that Congress has ever considered that 
as a reason for limiting federal-question jurisdiction, though it did consider it when expanding federal-question 
jurisdiction by eliminating the monetary jurisdictional floor. See supra text accompanying note 106.   
145.  See supra text accompanying note 103.   
146.  See, e.g., SCommJud96, supra note 93, at 149–50 (colloquy between Senator Max Baucus, Member, 
Committee on the Judiciary, and Prof. Herbert Wechsler); id. at 163–64 (Appendix C to statement of Daniel J. 
Meador, Assistant Attorney General); HSubcommCCLJud95, supra note 104, at 272 (statement of Joseph F. 
Spaniol, Jr., Assistant Director, Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts).  
147.  See Act of Dec. 1, 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, Title III, § 310(a), 104 Stat. 5113 (codified at 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1367 (2012)). 
148.  See supra text accompanying notes 105–106. 
149.  When Congress enacted supplemental jurisdiction, Act of Dec. 1, 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, Title 
III, § 310(a), 104 Stat. 5113 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2012)), to replace the federal common law of pendent 
and ancillary jurisdiction, it appeared to reduce district courts’ discretion to dismiss state claims accompanying 
federal claims when both are “part of the same case or controversy under Article III. . . .” Id. United Mine Workers 
v. Gibbs, 383 U.S 715 (1966), characterized pendent jurisdiction as “a doctrine of discretion, not of plaintiff’s 
right, . . .” id. at 726, and articulated four factors that district courts could consider in deciding to retain or dismiss 
what then were called pendent claims: whether exercising jurisdiction (1) would promote convenience, judicial 
economy, and fairness to litigants, id., (2) require avoidable decisions on the interpretation of unclear state law, 
id., (3) whether the state law claims “substantially predominate” over the federal claims, id. at 726–27, and (4) the 
likelihood of jury confusion if the claims were tried together. Id. at 727. The Court also noted that if the district 
court dismissed the federal claims before trial, it should also dismiss the state claims.  Id. at 726.  
 The statute seems to make exercising supplemental jurisdiction the default, explicitly limiting the district 
courts’ discretion to factors that echo some of the Gibbs factors:   
(c) The district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim . . . if (1)  the 
claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law, (2) the claim substantially predominates over the 
claim or claims over which the district court has original jurisdiction, (3) the district court has 
dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction, or (4) inexceptional circumstances, there 
are other compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction. 
28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) (2012). The first and fourth Gibbs factors have disappeared. The Circuits have split about 
the significance of this. See infra note 150. 
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circuits,150 but it did nothing to contract it.151 
It is noteworthy also that in 2005, Congress increased the federal courts’ 
diversity docket load with CAFA. As Professor Purcell noted, “it moved against 
the general trend toward limiting diversity jurisdiction that had marked most 
reform campaigns since the late nineteenth century and, unlike the majority of 
those restrictive efforts, became law.” Why did Congress, in an era of when the 
congestion of the federal docket was of such concern,152 make it possible for 
nationwide class actions to be in federal court? CAFA supporters sought to blunt 
the strategy of class counsel to frame proposed nationwide classes so as to inhibit 
the removal of broad-reaching class actions to federal court and thereby to exploit 
particular state courts thought exceptionally amenable to class certification. CAFA 
authorizes a change in the forum that shall rule on the class certification question 
precisely in order to drive a change in result on that question in some instances.153  
All the available evidence fails to offer even minimal support to the Court’s 
assertion that Congress has calibrated the federal-state judicial balance carefully 
with respect to federal-question jurisdiction.154 (The same is true of diversity 
                                                                                                                                                 
150.  See John B. Oakley, Prospectus for the American Law Institute’s Federal Judicial Code Revision 
Project, 31 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 855, 943–44 n.381 (1998). According to the Ninth Circuit, “[b]“y selecting this 
statutory structure, it is clear that Congress intended section 1367(c) to provide the exclusive means by which 
supplemental jurisdiction can be declined by a court.” Exec. Software N. Am., Inc. v. United States Dist. Ct., 24 
F.3d 1545 (9th Cir. 1994), overruled on other grounds, Cal. Dep’t of Water Res. v. Powerex Corp., 533 F.3d 
1087 (9th Cir. 2008). But the Seventh Circuit has ruled that “[t]he legislative history indicates that the new statute 
is intended to codify rather than to alter the judge-made principles of pendent and pendent party jurisdiction. . . .” 
Brazinski v. Amoco Petroleum Additives Co., 6 F.3d 1176, 1182 (7th Cir. 1993). The Supreme Court has not 
resolved the split. 
151.  Edward A. Purcell, Jr., The Class Action Fairness Act in Perspective: The Old and the New in Federal 
Jurisdictional Reform, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1823, 1856–57 (2008). The Federal Interpleader Act, see 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1335(a)(1) (2012), authorizes federal jurisdiction if any two claimants are of diverse citizenship. Thus, Congress 
employed “minimal diversity” rather than the complete diversity that Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 
267 (1806), mandated for cases eligible for federal jurisdiction under the then-diversity statute. State Farm Fire 
& Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 530 (1967), held minimal diversity constitutional. Complete diversity was 
the rule in ordinary diversity cases (including class actions) until Congress enacted CAFA. Professor Purcell has 
noted Congress’s ability, using minimal diversity, to route almost any case to the federal courts “as long as the 
case involved, somehow and somewhere along the line, a diverse party.” Purcell, supra, at 1857–58. See also id. 
at 1858–60. 
152. See Appendix Part B. 
153. Samuel Issacharoff & Richard A. Nagareda, Class Settlements Under Attack, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 
1649, 1663 n.50 (2008) (footnote omitted). Congress’s doing so is a clear repudiation of the idea that there is 
parity between state and federal courts.  See Appendix, Part G. 
154.  There is no indication that Congress has thought about it at all, except perhaps in the limited context 
of the Declaratory Judgment Act making it possible for some cases to reach the federal courts that otherwise 
might not have, and in that context, the Court got the message wrong. See Trojan Horse, supra note 27 and 
accompanying text. See also id. at 562 n.154. 
 Representative Gilbert’s comment during floor debate is perhaps the most graphic statement of this benefit 
of the declaratory judgment: “Under the present law you take a step in the dark and then turn on the light to see 
if you stepped into a hole. Under the declaratory judgment law you turn on the light and then take the step.” 90 
CONG. REC. 2030 (1928). Gilbert’s comment reflected the predicament of a manufacturer that received a cease-
and-desist demand from a patentee asserting infringement. That left the manufacturer with a Hobson’s choice:  
either cease manufacturing the product or continue, thus running the risk of ever-increasing damages (if the 
patentee was correct) until such time that the patentee elected to sue. The Declaratory Judgment Act allowed the 
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jurisdiction. Congress often discusses it,155 but all it has ever actually done about 
it is to restrict it to some extent by adding a second possible corporate citizenship 
in 1958,156 and increasing the amount-in-controversy requirement.157) In the 
absence of legislative history offering any hint about Congress’s intentions with 
respect to federal-question jurisdiction, what is the source of the carefully 
calibrated balance to which the Court purports to defer? 
 IV. BEHIND THE CLOAK 
The answer to the preceding question is clear: there is no balance except the 
Court’s. If Congress has done any careful balancing with respect to federal-
question jurisdiction, it has kept deathly silent about it for a very long time. That 
is not to say that Congress never thinks about what kinds of claims should be in 
the federal courts.158 Many specialized jurisdictional statutes confer federal 
jurisdiction over particular types of claims irrespective of the amount in 
controversy, for example, admiralty,159 bankruptcy,160 interpleader,161 commerce 
and antitrust,162 intellectual property,163 civil rights,164 and state claims that ought 
to accompany related federal claims.165 Congress reinforced those areas with 
statutes allowing removal from state to federal court.166 
The congressional silence explains why the Court, when referring to the 
balance, never cites any legislative materials, relying instead on its own cases, 
                                                                                                                                                 
manufacture to secure a judicial determination of the infringement claim before deciding what course to take.   
155.  See Appendix. 
156.  See supra text accompanying notes 132–136. 
157.  See supra text accompanying notes 115–121. 
158.  On occasion, Congress even hears testimony referring to the “appropriate allocation of judicial 
business among the State and Federal Courts.” SCommJud96, supra note 93, at 21 (statement of Daniel J. Meador, 
Assistant Attorney General); id. at 43 (statement of Hon. Elmo B. Hunter); id. at 60 (colloquy between Senator 
Howard F. Metzenbaum, Member, Committee on the Judiciary, and Charles Wiggins). One must note, however, 
that discussions of appropriate allocation concern whether Congress should retain diversity jurisdiction. They 
deal with federal-question jurisdiction only in the limited context of whether Congress should allow removal of 
cases on the basis of federal defenses or counterclaims to state-created claims. See supra note 146 and 
accompanying text.   
159.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (2012). 
160.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (2012). 
161.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1335 (2012). 
162.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1337 (2012). 
163.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (2012). 
164.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (2012). 
165.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2012). 
166.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1441–1447 (2012). Many of those provisions antedate Congress’s grant of general 
federal-question jurisdiction in 1875 and so are now duplicative. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 97, § 5.1, at 267. 
The jurisdiction statute for civil rights cases, 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (2012), is a good example. Congress enacted its 
predecessor as part of the Ku Klux Klan Act, Act of Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13 (codified in 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1343, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985 (2012)),)) and it was necessary until 1875, when Congress enacted the 
predecessor of 28 U.S.C. § 1331, which granted general federal-question if the matter in controversy exceeded 
$500. Thereafter, it retained independent jurisdictional function until 1980, when Congress’s eliminated § 1331’s 
jurisdictional-amount floor; the civil-rights-jurisdiction statute never had an amount-in-controversy requirement. 
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which in turn rely only on other cases.167 At least the 2005 Court gets credit for 
admitting that it was assuming that Congress assumed the balance.168 Since 1986, 
the Court has decided three cases in which it discussed the supposed congressional 
balance, each dealing with a different area of law.169 Examining those cases is 
instructive. 
A. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Thompson 
Merrell Dow’s facts are straightforward; the Court’s decision is not. Plaintiffs’ 
children had deformities at birth, and Plaintiffs alleged that the pregnant mothers’ 
ingestion of a Merrell Dow drug caused those deformities. Plaintiffs asserted 
numerous claims, but only one is important for present purposes. It alleged that the 
defendant had misbranded the drug, violating the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act 
of 1938.170 That was negligence per se under state law. Thus, that count of the 
complaint was a hybrid claim,171 sounding in state law but with a necessary 
element of federal law.172 More than sixty years earlier, the Court had allowed 
federal-question jurisdiction in a hybrid case that the Merrell Dow majority 
cited,173  Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co.174 Merrell Dow certainly did not 
overrule Smith, and only three years earlier a unanimous Court had cited Smith 
with approval.175 Why, then, did the Court refuse jurisdiction in Merrell Dow? 
The majority’s statement of the issue forecast the decision: “whether the 
incorporation of a federal standard in a state law private action, when Congress has 
intended that there not be a federal private action for violations of that federal 
standard, makes the action one ‘arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of 
the United States.’”176 That is, to be sure, a reference to congressional intent, for 
which the Court cited nothing other than its own cases. 
                                                                                                                                                 
167.  See supra text accompanying notes 29–33.   
168.  See supra text accompanying note 30. 
169.  See Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251, 258 (2013) (patent law); Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. 
Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308 (2005) (Internal Revenue Code of 1954); Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. 
Thompson, 478 U.S. 804 (1986) (Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938).  
170.  FDCA, Pub. L. No. 716, 52 Stat. 1040, (codified as amended, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–399d (2012)).  
171.  See supra note 14.   
172.  The remaining claims sounded in state law without federal components. Had the Court allowed 
federal-question jurisdiction for the negligence-per-se count, they would have qualified as pendent claims. See 
United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966).  Today they would be proper supplemental claims. See 28 
U.S.C. § 1367 (2012).   
173.  Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 809 n.5. 
174.  See Smith v. Kan. City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180, 199 (1921) (“The general rule is that, where 
it appears from the bill or statement of the plaintiff that the right to relief depends upon the construction or 
application of the Constitution or laws of the United States, and that such federal claim is not merely colorable, 
and rests upon a reasonable foundation, the District Court has jurisdiction under this provision.”). 
175.  See Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 9 (1983) (“We have often held 
that a case ‘arose under’ federal law where the vindication of a right under state law necessarily turned on some 
construction of federal law, see, e.g., Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180 . . . (1921); Hopkins 
v. Walker, 244 U.S. 486 . . . (1917).”).  
176.  Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 805 (citation omitted).   
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The Court could have cited something from the legislative materials 
underlying FDCA. An early draft of a bill that eventually became FDCA did 
include a private right of action,177 but it was not in later versions of the bill. That 
might have provided some ammunition for the majority’s finding of congressional 
intent, yet the majority did not mention its disappearance. That may have been 
because the voluminous legislative materials on the bills178 that resulted in the 
FDCA in 1938 contain little explanation, and what little there is hardly supports 
the Court’s statement that, 
[w]e simply conclude that the congressional determination that there 
should be no federal remedy for the violation of this federal statute is 
tantamount to a congressional conclusion that the presence of a claimed 
violation of the statute as an element of a state cause of action is 
insufficiently “substantial” to confer federal-question jurisdiction.179 
Had legislative materials demonstrated the “congressional conclusion,” the 
Court would have been remiss in not citing them.180 But there was nothing 
                                                                                                                                                 
177.  See A Bill to Prevent the Manufacture, Shipment, and Sale of Adulterated or Misbranded Food, Drugs, 
and Cosmetics, and to Regulate Traffic Therein; to Prevent the False Advertisement of Food, Drugs, and 
Cosmetics, and for Other Purposes, Hearing on S. 1944 Before a Subcommittee of the S. Committee on 
Commerce, 73d Cong. § 24 (1933) [hereinafter SSubcommCommerce73FDCA] (“A right of action for damages 
shall accrue to any person for injury or death proximately caused by a violation of this Act.”). 
178.  See id.; A Bill to Prevent the Manufacture, Shipment, and Sale of Adulterated or Misbranded Food, 
Drugs, and Cosmetics, and to Regulate Traffic Therein; to Prevent the False Advertisement of Food, Drugs, and 
Cosmetics, and for Other Purposes, Hearing on S. 2800 Before the S. Committee on Commerce, 73d Cong. (1934) 
[hereinafter SSubCommCommerce74FDCA]. 
179.  Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 814 (footnote omitted). Some lower federal courts interpreted Merrell Dow 
as rejecting jurisdiction in hybrid cases and returning to the rule of Am. Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 
241 U.S. 257, 260 (1916) (“A suit arises under the law that creates the cause of action.”). See, e.g., Seinfeld v. 
Austen, 39 F.3d 761, 764 (7th Cir. 1994) (“Under Merrell Dow, therefore, “if federal law does not provide a 
private right of action, then a state law action based on its violation perforce does not raise a ‘substantial’ federal 
question.”). Accord, Rogers v. Platt, 814 F.2d 683, 688 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Willy v. Coastal Corp., 855 F.2d 1160 
(5th Cir. 1988); Oliver v. Trunkline Gas Co., 796 F.2d 86, 88–89 (5th Cir. 1986).   
180.  The Court is certainly not reluctant to cite legislative history when it supports the Court’s decisions.  
In its 2017 Term, the Court relied on legislative history three times. See Marinello v. U.S., 138 S. Ct. 1101, 1107 
(2018) (citing House and Senate Reports); Merit Mgmt. Gp., LP v. FTI Consulting, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 883, 889 
(2018) (citing a Senate Report); Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 U.S. 1612, 1634 (2018) (citing the Congressional 
Record). In each of the three Terms in which the Court decided Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251 (2013), Grable & 
Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg. Co., 545 U.S. 308 (2005), and Merrell Dow, it cited legislative 
history. See FTC v. Activis, Inc., 570 U.S. 136, 153 (2013) (citing the Congressional Record); Amgen Inc. v. 
Conn. Retirement Plans and Trust Funds, 568 U.S. 455, 476 (2013) (citing hearings and the House Conference 
Report); Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 716, 723 (2005) (citing the Congressional Record and Senate Report); 
Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 232 n.2 (2005) (citing the Congressional Record); Local 28 of Sheet 
Metal Workers’ Int’l Ass’n v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 469 n.40, 470 (1986) (citing the Congressional Record); 
Japan Whaling Ass’n v. Am. Cetacean Soc., 478 U.S. 221, 239 n.9 (1986) (citing hearings); Lyng v. Payne, 476 
U.S. 926, 929 (1986) (citing hearings); U.S. v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 741, 743 (1986) (citing hearings and Senate 
Report); Brock v. Pierce Cty., 476 U.S. 253, 264–65 (1986) (citing Senate Report); Sorenson v. Sec. of Treasury, 
475 U.S. 851, 865 (1986) (citing hearings); U.S. v. Am. Coll. of Physicians, 475 U.S. 834, 838, 840 n.3, 846 
(1986) (citing hearings); U.S. v. City of Fulton, 475 U.S. 657, 664 (1986) (citing hearings); Connolly v. Pension 
Ben. Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 216 (1986) (citing hearings). And in Jackson Transit Auth. v. Local Div. 1285, 
Amalgamated Transit Union, AFL-CIO-CLC, 457 U.S. 15, 24 (1982), the Court noted, “While the statutory 
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favorable to cite. There was, however, something quite unfavorable to the Court’s 
position. Several food industry witnesses urged Congress to strike the private-
right-of-action provision.181 Senator Copeland, a sponsor of the bill and Chairman 
of the Subcommittee hearing the testimony responded to one witness: “I said 
several times I cannot, for the life of us, see why this was put in the bill.  If the 
injury is received from some food or drug, there is a method provided for it at the 
present time.”182 Thus, the only available material on the disappearance of the 
private-right-of-action provision suggests that Congress eliminated it because it 
was superfluous, not because Congress thought there should not be private actions 
for recovery. 
In any event, whether a plaintiff could assert federal-question jurisdiction on a 
negligence-per-se theory would have had little effect on the federal courts’ 
workload. Any effect would have come only from actions by state citizens against 
in-state producers. Such actions would have had to proceed in the state courts in 
the absence of federal-question jurisdiction. That would have kept purely local 
cases out of the federal courts.183 Query, however, whether in a world with well-
developed distribution and transportation systems, with many producers 
distributing their goods across many states and nations, how likely it is that the 
bulk of such cases would not qualify for diversity jurisdiction.184 Some of the 
                                                                                                                                                 
language supplies no definitive answer, the legislative history is conclusive.” (citing House Hearings, Senate and 
House Reports, and the Congressional Record). 
181.  See infra note 182. 
182.  SSubcommCommerce73FDCA, supra note 177, at 205 (statement of Senator Royal S. Copeland, 
Chairman, Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Commerce). Producers’ organizations inveighed against 
it. For example, the California Fruit Exchange submitted the following statement to the Subcommittee. See id. at 
479. 
Section 24, Liability for Personal Injury, is very dangerous.  It should be eliminated, as it merely places 
the stamp of approval of the Federal Government on “ambulance chasers” and persons attempting to 
take unfair advantage.  One large food industry organization maintains a large fund for the express 
purpose of fighting professional damage seekers.  There is plenty of law on the statute books at the 
present time under which a person can sue for damages.  This additional language is not needed. 
Id. See also id. at 114 (statement of Dr. James H. Beal, National Drug Trade Conference); id. at 145 (statement 
of Francis L. Whitmarsh, Pure Food and Legislative Committee of the National American Wholesale Grocers’ 
Association); id. at 161 (statement of Dr. John F. Anderson, E.R. Squib & Sons).   
183.  Merrell Dow could have been a diversity case because the plaintiffs in the consolidated cases were 
from Canada and Scotland, and Ohio was the state of Merrell Dow’s incorporation. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2) 
(2012). But the plaintiffs sued in an Ohio state court, and Merrell Dow, an Ohio citizen, could not remove the 
case on diversity grounds. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2) (2012). So Merrell Dow removed both of the original cases 
on the theory that the negligence-per-se count that the plaintiffs asserted qualified for federal-question 
jurisdiction. Removal occurs automatically upon a timely petition for removal. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(d). The federal 
court consolidated the cases and denied plaintiffs’ motion to remand. Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 806.   
184.  Focusing on the largest and best-known pharmaceutical companies illustrates the phenomenon.  Pfizer 
is a Delaware corporation with its headquarters in New York, see Pfizer, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Feb. 
29, 2016), available at https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/78003/000007800316000077/pfe-12312015x1 
0kshell.htm (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review), as is Bristol-Myers Squibb.  See Bristol-
Myers Squibb, Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Feb. 12, 2016), available at https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/da 
ta/14272/000001427216000288/bmy-20151231x10xk.htm (on file with The University of the Pacific Law 
Review). Johnson & Johnson and Merck & Co. are both New Jersey corporations with their headquarters in New 
Jersey. See Johnson & Johnson, Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Feb. 2429, 2016),) available at 
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largest pharmaceutical companies have only one state citizenship; others have 
two.185 Any plaintiff not a citizen of one of a defendant corporation’s states, 
assuming she can allege in excess of $75,000 in damages, can file in a federal 
court. The Court’s concern in Merrell Dow with the number of hybrid FDCA cases 
the federal courts might have to hear as federal-question cases rings hollow.186 
Merrell Dow raised, but never even attempted to answer, another important 
question about the Court’s analysis. It is one thing to attempt to infer congressional 
intent about jurisdiction from a jurisdictional statute; it is quite another to infer 
such intent from non-jurisdictional statutes. How are the Justices to know, when 
construing a statute having nothing to do with subject-matter jurisdiction, that there 
lurked in the congressional mind187 some unexpressed intent to direct the Court to 
construe a jurisdictional statute differently? Unfortunately, the two ensuing cases 
dealing with federal-question jurisdiction do not assist that inquiry. 
B. Grable & Sons Metal Products, Inc. v. Darue Engineering & Manufacturing 
Grable built on the foundation that Merrell Dow failed to supply. Justice 
Souter’s opinion for the unanimous Court188 noted that the Court had granted 
                                                                                                                                                 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/200406/000020040616000071/form10-k20160103.htm (on file with 
The University of the Pacific Law Review); Merck & Co., Inc., Annual Report. (Form 10-K) (Feb. 26, 2013),) 
available at https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/310158/000119312513084618/d438975d10k.htm (on file 
with The University of the Pacific Law Review). Eli Lilly is an Indiana corporation with its headquarters in that 
state. See Eli Lilly and Co., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Feb. 19, 2016), available at 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/59478/000005947816000321/lly-20151231x10k.htm (on file with The 
University of the Pacific Law Review). Abbott Laboratories is entirely from Illinois. See Abbott Labs., Annual 
Report (Form 10-K) (Feb. 27, 2015), available at https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1800/000104746915 
001377/a2222655z10-k.htm on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).   
185.  See id. 
186.  There is yet another problem with the Merrell Dow Court’s reliance on the FDCA Congress’s intent. 
Assuming arguendo (1) that Congress had some jurisdictional intent and (2) the Court’s majority correctly 
divined that intent, why is it even relevant? The FDCA Congress did not amend (or even mention) the federal-
question jurisdiction statute. The most recent recodification of federal-question jurisdiction had happened in 1911, 
see Act of Mar. 3, 1911, ch 231, § 24, 36 Stat. 1087, 1091 (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction as 
follows: “First . . .  where the matter in controversy exceeds, exclusive of interest and costs, the sum or value of 
three thousand dollars and (a) arises under the Constitution or laws of the United States, or treaties made, or which 
shall be made, under their authority. . . .”). 
 The language concerning federal-question jurisdiction was not materially different from what exists today, 
see 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2012), or what existed in 1875, when Congress enacted the 1911 statute’s predecessor. See 
supra note 10. The Merrell Dow Court in effect attributed to the 1938 Congress, without evidence, an amendatory 
intent with respect to a statute originally enacted sixty-three years earlier and recodified twenty-seven years earlier 
that Congress never mentioned, and gave that assumed intent the force of law without it having gone through the 
process that the Constitution prescribes for enacting legislation. That is the very sort of end run that the Court had 
condemned only three years earlier in Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 952–59 
(1983).   
187.  I recognize that even using this phrase is making a hell of a big assumption. See supra note 20. 
188.  Justice Thomas concurred, agreeing with Justice Souter’s analysis under long-established law, but 
arguing that the Court, for the sake of simplicity and clarity, should return to the law-that-creates-the-cause-of-
action test that Justice Holmes articulated in Am. Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257, 260 
(2016). Grable, 545 U.S. at 320–21 (Thomas, J., concurring). But see supra note 179, suggesting that Holmes’s 
formula did not command a majority even in American Well Works.   
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certiorari “to resolve a split within the Courts of Appeals on whether Merrell Dow 
. . . always requires a federal cause of action as a condition for exercising federal-
question jurisdiction,”189 thus acknowledging the confusion that Merrell Dow 
generated. But the Court was explicit that it had not intended Merrell Dow to 
establish that (or any) bright-line test and denied that one could properly read that 
case as having done so.190 
Merrell Dow regarded the absence of a private right of action as weighing 
against federal-question jurisdiction in a hybrid case. Grable seemed to back away 
from that, characterizing the absence of a private right of action as “Congress 
indicat[ing] ambivalence.”191 The Court did not cite anything tending to 
demonstrate that Congress was ambivalent or that Congress had even thought 
about a private right of action at all. Grable and Merrell Dow are two instances of 
the Court “hearing” the sounds of silence.192 
There is good reason to suspect Congress had never thought about it. Grable 
concerned an Internal Revenue Service seizure and sale of Grable’s property to 
satisfy a tax delinquency. That occurred under the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 
as amended. The federal issue was whether the Code section specifying service of 
a notice of sale on a delinquent taxpayer required personal service rather than 
substituted service by certified mail.193 Consider how likely it is that the 1954 
Congress, which enacted the Internal Revenue Code, spent much time (a) mulling 
over whether service under that provision had to be in-hand,194 and (b) ever 
considered whether violation of the service provision should be a predicate for 
federal-question jurisdiction. 
And yet, the Court waxed eloquent about Congress’s intent. 
For the federal issue will ultimately qualify for a federal forum only if 
federal jurisdiction is consistent with congressional judgment about the 
sound division of labor between state and federal courts governing the 
application of § 1331. 
*  *  * 
The meaning of the federal tax provision is an important issue of federal 
law that sensibly belongs in a federal court. The Government has a strong 
interest in the “prompt and certain collection of delinquent taxes,” . . . and 
                                                                                                                                                 
189.  Grable, 545 U.S. at 311–12. See supra note 179.   
190.  Grable, 545 U.S. at 317. 
191.  Id. at 320. 
192.  Simon & Garfunkel should be proud. See SIMON & GARFUNKEL, THE SOUNDS OF SILENCE (Columbia 
Studios 1964).   
193.  See 26 U.S.C. § 6335 (2012). Grable did receive the mail and thus had actual notice. Grable, 545 U.S. 
at 310. 
194.  The statutory text appears fairly clearly to support specified forms of substituted service, and Grable 
had lost on that issue in both the district and the circuit court. See Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue 
Eng’g & Mfg., 207 F. Supp. 2d 694 (W.D. Mich. 2002), aff’d, 377 F.3d 592 (6th Cir. 2004) (note that the Sixth 
Circuit, where Merrell Dow originated, obviously did not read that decision as having excluded all hybrid cases). 
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the ability of the IRS to satisfy its claims from the property of delinquents 
requires clear terms of notice to allow buyers like Darue to satisfy 
themselves that the Service has touched the bases necessary for good title. 
The Government thus has a direct interest in the availability of a federal 
forum to vindicate its own administrative action, and buyers (as well as 
tax delinquents) may find it valuable to come before judges used to federal 
tax matters. Finally, because it will be the rare state title case that raises a 
contested matter of federal law, federal jurisdiction to resolve genuine 
disagreement over federal tax title provisions will portend only a 
microscopic effect on the federal-state division of labor.195 
The juxtaposition of two excerpts from the Court’s opinion is interesting. The 
first speaks of “congressional judgment about the sound division of labor between 
state and federal courts,”196 but cites nothing except Franchise Tax Board v. 
Construction Laborers Vacation Trust,197 an ERISA198 case that decided whether 
a hybrid claim under a state’s declaratory judgment statute qualified for federal-
question jurisdiction using the approach of Skelly Oil,199 a case under the federal 
Declaratory Judgment Act.200 The Franchise Tax Board Court paid lip service to 
congressional intent, but the only mention of a specific intent was that Congress 
made clear that it had not intended the federal law involved “to preempt entirely 
every state cause of action relating to such plans.”201 That is well enough, but the 
Court did not explain why a decision not to preempt suggested, much less 
compelled, the conclusion that Congress would not have wanted there to be 
federal-question jurisdiction in cases involving ERISA. The Court cited no 
legislative history concerning federal-question jurisdiction.202 
Now consider the second excerpt. The first sentence makes a policy argument; 
it is not a statement of law.203 The same is true of the second part of the quotation; 
there the Court fleshed out its preceding assertion, going into more detail of why 
                                                                                                                                                 
195.  Grable, 545 U.S. at 313–15. One might sense a counterintuitive irony in the concluding sentence. The 
Court appears implicitly to take the position that the more often a particular federal issue will arise in litigation, 
the less appropriate it is to exercise federal-question jurisdiction.   
196. Id. 
197.  463 U.S. 1 (1983).   
198.  Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 89 Stat. 829 (current 
version at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2012)). 
199.  See supra text accompanying notes 24–27. 
200.  See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201–2202 (2012). 
201.  Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 25. 
202.  The Court did cite one remark from the Congressional Record, but it appears to have nothing to do 
with federal-question jurisdiction. See Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 1, 24 n.26 (“ERISA’s legislative history 
indicates that, in light of the act’s virtually unique preemption provision, . . . ‘a body of Federal substantive law 
will be developed by the courts to deal with issues involving rights and obligations under private welfare and 
pension plans.’”) (quoting 120 CONG. REC. 29,942 (1974) (statement of Sen. Javits)).  
203.  The Court has often asserted policy judgments are not appropriate judicial territory. See supra text 
accompanying notes 36–38; infra text accompanying notes 230–252.   
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such cases “sensibly belong[ ] in a federal court.”204 The third sentence adverts to 
the balance of work between federal and state judiciaries. Note that Congress is 
entirely absent from the discussion. Surely the arguments the Court found 
compelling would have found some mention, at some point, in the legislative 
process. That clearly would have supported the Court’s assertion about 
congressional intent, but there was no mention. It therefore is appropriate to ask 
which institution—Congress or the Court—is really making the judgment about 
the sound division of labor. 
Between those two excerpts lies an even more interesting statement. 
“[A]rising-under jurisdiction to hear a state-law claim always raises the possibility 
of upsetting the state-federal line drawn (or at least assumed) by Congress. . . .”205 
In this context, that is a confession of sorts. Without support in any legislative 
history, the Court is assuming that Congress assumed a sophisticated balance of 
the distribution of work between federal and state judiciaries. This is reminiscent 
of Judge Friendly’s famous comment: “Our principal task, in this diversity of 
citizenship case, is to determine what the New York courts would think the 
California courts would think on an issue about which neither has thought.”206 This 
is the stuff of which crystal balls are made. The Court admits here that it is not 
deducing what Congress actually intended, nor is it even inferring congressional 
intent from any congressional materials discussing it. The balance is the Court’s. 
To the extent that Grable clarified Merrell Dow (or did it?), it may represent 
doctrinal development, though it is difficult to pin down exactly what the doctrine 
is. Eight years later, Gunn v. Minton207 attempted to be more specific. Chief Justice 
Roberts wrote for a unanimous Court. 
C. Gunn v. Minton 
Minton, a client, sued the Gunn attorneys for malpractice in handling a patent 
infringement suit, arguing that they had failed to raise a winning argument. His 
case depended on whether that failure caused his defeat; the attorneys argued that 
it did not. Minton’s malpractice case was in a Texas state court.208 The trial court 
ruled for the defendants, and on appeal, Minton argued that the trial court had 
lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because the malpractice action, depending as it 
did on patent law, was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts. 
Although he lost in an intermediate appellate court, the Texas Supreme Court 
                                                                                                                                                 
204. Grable, 545 U.S. at 315. 
205. Id. at 314. 
206.  Nolan v. Transocean Airlines, 276 F.2d 280 (2d Cir. 1960), judgment set aside and remanded for 
reconsideration, 365 U.S. 293 (1961). The remand occurred because of a change in California law that the 
California Supreme Court announced after judgment in the district court. The change occurred shortly before oral 
argument in the Second Circuit, which had no occasion to consider it. Nolan, 365 U.S. at 295. The Supreme Court 
had no quarrel with Judge Friendly’s statement of the issue. On reconsideration, the Second Circuit again affirmed 
the district court’s decision. Nolan v. Transocean Airlines, 290 F.2d 904 (2d Cir. 1961).   
207.  568 U.S. 251 (2013).   
208.  The patent case had been in federal court, as 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (2012) required.   
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reversed in a split opinion, apparently leaving Minton free to recommence his 
malpractice action in a federal court.209 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari. The Chief Justice wrote: 
In an effort to bring some order to this unruly doctrine several Terms ago, 
we condensed our prior cases into the following inquiry: Does the “state-
law claim necessarily raise a stated federal issue, actually disputed and 
substantial, which a federal forum may entertain without disturbing any 
congressionally approved balance of federal and state judicial 
responsibilities”? That is, federal jurisdiction over a state law claim will 
lie if a federal issue is: (1) necessarily raised, (2) actually disputed, 
(3) substantial, and (4) capable of resolution in federal court without 
disrupting the federal-state balance approved by Congress.210 
That was nothing new. The first point is a restatement of the well-pleaded-
complaint rule.211 The second comes from Gully v. First National Bank,212 an 
opinion by Justice Cardozo upon which the Court often relies in federal-question 
cases. The Court announced the last two criteria in Merrell Dow,213 and Grable 
simply adverted to them. The four-prong test merely consolidates previously 
announced factors for determining federal-question jurisdiction. It offers little, if 
any, clarification of the unruly doctrine. 
The doctrine today is no less unruly than it was ten, twenty, thirty, or forty 
years ago—or indeed, back to the beginning of federal-question jurisdiction well 
over a century ago. The question is who is responsible, and Congress and the Court 
must share the credit. Congress did its part by using as open-ended a term as 
“arising under,” clearly copying the Constitution’s language,214 and perhaps 
expecting that the language would have the same broad meaning that Chief Justice 
Marshall had announced in Osborn v. Bank of the United States.215  Senator 
Carpenter’s lonely statement in support of the 1875 rebirth of federal-question 
suggested as much.216 
                                                                                                                                                 
209.  Whether it made sense to do so is another matter. The Texas trial court had ruled that Minton “had 
put forward ‘less than a scintilla of proof’” and granted summary judgment to the attorneys. Gunn, 568 U.S. at 
255 (quoting the trial court). 
210.  Id. at 258 (quoting Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 314 
(2005)). 
211.  See Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908). 
212.  299 U.S. 109 (1936). 
213.  478 U.S. 804 (1986). 
214.  See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
215.  22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824). Marshall seems to have thought that if either party could spell 
“federal,” that was close enough for constitutional federal-question jurisdiction.   
216.  See supra note 15. One should note that the Senator’s remarks came in the context of a spirited debate 
concerning provisions of the bill that had implications for personal jurisdiction and venue. No part of the debate 
suggested any dissatisfaction with the bill’s provisions for subject-matter jurisdiction. However, Senator 
Carpenter’s remark addressed itself to the entire bill, including its provisions for service of process. Although it 
encompassed the entire bill, including the provision for federal-question jurisdiction, Senator Carpenter did not 
specifically address that more limited matter. See 2 CONG. REC. 4978–4988 (1874).   
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Placing the entire weight on Congress, however, overlooks the Court’s 
significant contributions to the confusion. That, of course, has not stopped the 
Court from blaming the confusion on Congress.217 It is time to pierce the cloak and 
pull aside the curtain.218 
D.  Behind the Screens (and Scenes) 
1. Whose Balance Is It? 
The Court is correct about one thing concerning federal-question jurisdiction:  
there is a carefully calibrated balancing that has been going on over a long period 
of time. However, the Court is wrong—perhaps disingenuous—about the branch 
of the government doing the balancing. The record shows that almost all 
congressional balancing involving subject-matter jurisdiction occurred with 
respect to diversity, not federal-question, jurisdiction, with two exceptions.219 With 
respect to diversity, Congress clearly was most concerned with the federal courts’ 
docket load,220 but the only time Congress even mentioned federal court congestion 
with respect to federal-question jurisdiction was in 1979–1980 when it considered 
and re-enacted the general federal-question statute without its previous 
jurisdictional-amount floor.221 
The Court used to be more straightforward. In a famous passage in Gully v. 
First National Bank,222 Justice Cardozo made no bones about the Court’s process: 
What is needed is something of that common-sense accommodation of 
judgment to kaleidoscopic situations which characterizes the law in its 
treatment of problems of causation. One could carry the search for causes 
backward, almost without end . . . Instead, there has been a selective 
process which picks the substantial causes out of the web and lays the other 
ones aside. As in problems of causation, so here in the search for the 
underlying law. If we follow the ascent far enough, countless claims of 
right can be discovered to have their source or their operative limits in the 
provisions of a federal statute or in the Constitution itself with its 
circumambient restrictions upon legislative power. To set bounds to the 
pursuit, the courts have formulated the distinction between controversies 
that are basic and those that are collateral, between disputes that are 
necessary and those that are merely possible. We shall be lost in a maze if 
                                                                                                                                                 
217.  See supra text accompanying notes 167–170, 199–203. 
218.  See supra text accompanying notes 3–8. 
219.  One is Congress’s decision to codify a law of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction (now “supplemental 
jurisdiction”) doctrines the Court had developed. See supra text accompanying notes 145–150. The other is the 
elimination of the amount-in-controversy requirement. See supra text accompanying notes 103–105. 
220.  See Appendix, Part B. 
221.  See supra text accompanying notes 101–106. 
222.  299 U.S. 109 (1936). 
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we put that compass by.223 
He admitted forthrightly that the courts made the decisions about which cases 
were worth federal-question jurisdiction and which were not. He did not attempt 
to shift responsibility to Congress. 
Justice Frankfurter followed Justice Cardozo’s lead. In Romero v. 
International Terminal Operating Co.,224 his opinion for the Court characterized 
statutory federal-question jurisdiction as having 
been continuously construed and limited in the light of the history that 
produced it, the demands of reason and coherence, and the dictates of 
sound judicial policy which have emerged from the [statute’s] function as 
a provision in the mosaic of federal judiciary legislation. It is a statute, not 
a Constitution, we are expounding. 
Here, too, there is no pretense that the Court walked a line Congress drew. 
Construing laws is the province of the courts. Justice Frankfurter noted the things 
the Court had considered in making its jurisdictional decisions: history and sound 
judicial policy. And in 1983, a unanimous Court, speaking through Chief Justice 
Burger, quoted that language from Romero with obvious approval.225 
Only in 1986 did the Court begin to attribute its federal-question decisions to 
congressional jurisdictional balancing that appears nowhere in any records.226 
“[D]eterminations about federal jurisdiction require sensitive judgments about 
congressional intent, judicial power, and the federal system.”227 The Court’s 
exercise of its sensitive judgment apparently was unable to identify any actual 
manifestations of congressional intent. The Court’s repeated cite-less vision of 
congressional intent raises an important question. Why does the Court think it is 
necessary to employ this cloaking device? 
2. Judicial Policy-Making and Federal Common Law 
The cloak attempts to shield the Court from self-condemnation, a classic 
example of the psychological phenomenon of projection:228 
the process by which one attributes one’s own individual positive or 
negative characteristics, affects, and impulses to another person or group. 
                                                                                                                                                 
223.  Id. at 117 (emphasis added). 
224.  358 U.S. 354, 379 (1959). 
225.  See Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 494–95 (1983). 
226.  See Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804 (1986). In Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips 
Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667 (1950), Justice Frankfurter spoke (incorrectly) of Congress’s intent with respect to 
the Declaratory Judgment Act, see supra text accompanying notes 24–27, but at least there the Court focused on 
that specific statute rather than adverting to some hypothetical congressional architecture for federal and state 
judicial jurisdiction more generally.   
227.  Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 810. 
228.  See supra note 8. 
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This is often a defense mechanism in which unpleasant or unacceptable 
impulses, stressors, ideas, affects, or responsibilities are attributed to 
others . . . Such defensive patterns are often used to justify prejudice or 
evade responsibility.229 
The Court talks about congressional balancing but proves none and attributes 
its own conduct to Congress. The Court does not want the weight of the balancing, 
as it were, to be on its shoulders. Why is that? 
The Court has often instructed that it cannot properly inquire into the wisdom 
underlying constitutional statutes and will not do so.230 Yet in this area, it clearly 
has. The carefully articulated approach that Chief Justice Roberts outlined in Gunn 
v. Minton,231 insofar as it purports to rest on congressional intent, is a structure with 
no foundation. Justice Scalia once noted that Judge Harold Leventhal, a former 
colleague of Justice Scalia’s on the United States Circuit Court for the District of 
Columbia, “used to describe the use of legislative history as the equivalent of 
entering a crowded cocktail party and looking over the heads of the guests for one’s 
friends.”232 The complete absence of references to anything even tending to 
demonstrate the kind of intent the Court routinely attributes to Congress suggests 
that the Court has no friends at this particular congressional cocktail party. 
The truth is that the Court—perhaps with the best of intentions—has fashioned 
an amorphous body of federal common law. There is nothing inherently wrong 
with federal common law,233 but Justices across the judicial spectrum have always 
                                                                                                                                                 
229.  AM. PSYCHOL. ASS’N, APA DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOLOGY 843 (2d ed. 2015) (emphasis added). 
230.  See, e.g., Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 194–95 (1978).  
Our individual appraisal of the wisdom or unwisdom of a particular course consciously selected by 
the Congress is to be put aside in the process of interpreting a statute. Once the meaning of an 
enactment is discerned and its constitutionality determined, the judicial process comes to an end. We 
do not sit as a committee of review, nor are we vested with the power of veto . . . [I]n our constitutional 
system the commitment to the separation of powers is too fundamental for us to pre-empt 
congressional action by judicially decreeing what accords with “common sense and the public weal.” 
Our Constitution vests such responsibilities in the political branches. 
Id. See also Griswold v. Conn., 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965) (“We do not sit as a super-legislature to determine the 
wisdom, need, and propriety of laws that touch economic problems, business affairs, or social conditions.”); 
Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 731–32 (1963) (“We refuse to sit as a ‘superlegislature to weigh the wisdom 
of legislation. . . .’); Hamilton v. Ky. Distilleries & Warehouse Co., 251 U.S. 146, 161 (1919) (citations omitted) 
(“No principle of our constitutional law is more firmly established than that this court [sic] may not, in passing 
on the validity of a statute, inquire into the motives of Congress. . . . Nor may it pass upon the necessity for the 
exercise of a power possessed, since the possible abuse of a power is not an argument against its existence.”); 
U.S. v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 91 U.S. 72, 91 (1875) (“We cannot sit in judgment upon [a statute’s] wisdom or 
policy. When we have interpreted its provisions, if Congress has power to enact it, our duty in connection with it 
is ended.”); see also supra text accompanying notes 36–38. 
231.  458 U.S. 251, 258 (2013). See supra text accompanying note 210. 
232.  Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 519 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring). Then-Judge Patricia Wald, also 
a member of that court, recalls Judge Leventhal saying the same thing in a conversation with her. See Patricia M. 
Wald, Some Observations on the Use of Legislative History in the 1981 Supreme Court Term, 68 IOWA L. REV. 
195, 214 & n.143 (1983). 
233.  Contrary to the recollections of many lawyers (and students at examination time), Erie v. Tompkins, 
304 U.S. 64 (1938), did not say there is no federal common law. It made the quite distinct statement that “there 
is no federal general common law,” id. at 78 (emphasis added), by which Justice Brandeis meant that there could 
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cautioned that it needs to be in furtherance of some federal law234 or in an area of 
“uniquely federal interest.”235 They have cautioned repeatedly against the federal 
courts making policy judgments. 
For example, in Boyle v. United Technologies, Inc.,236 a product-liability case, 
the majority recognized a federal-contractors’-immunity defense that the Fourth 
Circuit had created as federal common law.237 The defense prevented recovery that 
state law would have allowed. Justice Scalia’s majority opinion noted that the 
government’s ability to purchase military equipment to its specifications without 
exposing contractors to potential liability for product defects (which presumably 
would have tended to increase product cost) was a uniquely federal interest. But 
the majority imposed another requirement for creating federal common law, at 
least when the federal common law would displace state law. 
That the procurement of equipment by the United States is an area of 
uniquely federal interest does not, however, end the inquiry. That merely 
establishes a necessary, not a sufficient, condition for the displacement of 
state law. Displacement will occur only where, as we have variously 
described, a “significant conflict” exists between an identifiable “federal 
policy or interest and the [operation] of state law,” . . . or the application 
of state law would “frustrate specific objectives” of federal legislation . . . 
The conflict with federal policy need not be as sharp as that which must 
exist for ordinary pre-emption when Congress legislates “in a field which 
                                                                                                                                                 
be no federal common law (as there had been under the regime of Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842)) in 
areas that the Constitution had not assigned to the federal government. His statement was a repudiation of natural-
law theory in favor of legal positivism. See Donald L. Doernberg, The Unseen Track of Erie Railroad: Why 
History and Jurisprudence Suggest a More Straightforward Form of Erie Analysis, 109 W. VA. L. REV. 611, 621, 
623–25 (2007). 
234.  See, e.g., Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677 (1979) (applying four previously identified criteria 
to the question of whether the Court should imply a private right of action in Title IX of the Education 
Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318, § 901, 86 Stat. 235, 373 (current version at 20 U.S.C. § 1981 (2012)).). 
See also D’Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447, 469–70 (1942) (Jackson, J., concurring) (quoting Erie, 
304 U.S. at 78) (quoting the Rules of Decision Act, Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73 (current 
version at 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2012)). 
I do not understand Justice Brandeis’s statement . . . that “There is no federal general common law,” 
to deny that the common law may in proper cases be an aid to or the basis of decision of federal 
questions. In its context it means to me only that federal courts may not apply their own notions of the 
common law at variance with applicable state decisions except “where the Constitution, treaties, or 
statutes of the United States [so] require or provide.” 
Id. (citation and footnote omitted). 
235.  See, e.g., Tex. Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 640 (1981). 
[T]he Court has recognized the need and authority in some limited areas to formulate what has come 
to be known as “federal common law,” . . . These instances are “few and restricted,” . . . and fall into 
essentially two categories: those in which a federal rule of decision is “necessary to protect uniquely 
federal interests,” . . . and those in which Congress has given the courts the power to develop 
substantive law. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
236.  487 U.S. 500 (1988). 
237.  See Tozer v. LTV Corp., 792 F.2d 403 (4th Cir. 1986). 
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the States have traditionally occupied” . . .  Or to put the point differently, 
the fact that the area in question is one of unique federal concern changes 
what would otherwise be a conflict that cannot produce pre-emption into 
one that can. But conflict there must be.238 
There was no mention of congressional intent. 
Ironically, there was a legislative record available from which the Court might 
have made at least a weak inference of congressional intent, but it cut the wrong 
way. As Justice Brennan’s dissent pointed out, Congress previously had 
considered six bills that would either have established the immunity or provided 
indemnification for the contractors. None survived the legislative process.239  
Justice Brennan even quoted a colleague’s protest against a federal-common-law 
extension of a doctrine insulating the government from tort liability arising from 
injuries to servicemen incident to military service240 to cover “negligence on the 
part of civilian employees of the Federal Government.”241 The author of that 
protest was none other than Justice Scalia (whom Justice Brennan had joined) just 
a year before Boyle: 
As it did almost four decades ago in Feres . . . , the Court today provides 
several reasons why Congress might have been wise to exempt from the 
Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) . . . certain claims brought by 
servicemen.  The problem now, as then, is that Congress not only failed to 
provide such an exemption, but quite plainly excluded it. We have not been 
asked by respondent here to overrule Feres; but I can perceive no reason 
to accept petitioner’s invitation to extend it as the Court does today. 
*  *  * 
If our [extension of Feres] bore the legitimacy of having been prescribed 
by the people’s elected representatives, it would (insofar as we are 
permitted to inquire into such things) be just. But it has not been, and it is 
not.242 
But Justice Scalia’s Boyle opinion did not even mention his Johnson dissent 
and ignored Justice Brennan’s mention of the failed efforts in Congress. Said 
Justice Brennan, 
Were I a legislator, I would probably vote against any law absolving 
multibillion dollar private enterprises from answering for their tragic 
mistakes, at least if that law were justified by no more than the 
                                                                                                                                                 
238.  Boyle, 487 U.S. at 507–08 (footnotes and citations omitted). 
239.  See id. at 515 & n.1 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
240.  See Feres v. U.S., 340 U.S. 135 (1950). 
241.  U.S. v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681, 682 (1987). 
242.  Id. at 692, 703 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis added and citations omitted). 
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unsupported speculation that their liability might ultimately burden the 
United States Treasury. Some of my colleagues here would evidently vote 
otherwise (as they have here), but that should not matter here. We are 
judges not legislators, and the vote is not ours to cast.243 
He clearly regarded what the majority had done as a usurpation. 
A few years earlier, another Justice had decried a majority’s creation of federal 
common law, even though it furthered a congressional policy that a recent statute 
clearly expressed. Cannon v. University of Chicago244 involved a claim under Title 
IX of the Educational Amendments of 1972245 that the University had refused to 
admit the plaintiff to its medical school because of her sex. The statute contained 
no private right of action. Nonetheless, Justice Stevens’s opinion for the Court 
implied a private right of action in the statute based on criteria for implying such a 
right in a statute that the Court had announced four years earlier in Cort v. Ash.246 
The majority found that Congress (1) had enacted Title IX for the benefit of a 
special class of which Cannon was a member and (2) had not indicated any 
intention to deny such an action.247 The Court also considered (3) whether 
implying a right of action “would frustrate the underlying purpose of the legislative 
scheme,”248 and (4) whether it should forgo implication because “the subject 
matter involves an area basically of concern to the States.”249 Finding that all four 
criteria pointed in the direction of implying a private right of action, the Court did 
so. Two years after Cannon, the Court ruled that the four criteria went to “the 
ultimate issue [of] whether Congress intended to create a private right of action.”250 
Justice Powell dissented vigorously, asking why, if it was so clear that 
                                                                                                                                                 
243.  Id. at 531 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens’s dissent also highlighted his disagreement with 
Boyle’s creation of common law:  
When judges are asked to embark on a lawmaking venture, I believe they should carefully consider 
whether they, or a legislative body, are better equipped to perform the task at hand. There are instances 
of so-called interstitial lawmaking that inevitably become part of the judicial process. But when we 
are asked to create an entirely new doctrine—to answer “questions of policy on which Congress has 
not spoken,” . . . we have a special duty to identify the proper decisionmaker before trying to make 
the proper decision. When the novel question of policy involves a balancing of the conflicting interests 
in the efficient operation of a massive governmental program and the protection of the rights of the 
individual—whether in the social welfare context, the civil service context, or the military 
procurement context—I feel very deeply that we should defer to the expertise of the Congress. 
Boyle v. United Tech., Inc., 487 U.S. 500, 531–32 (1988) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
244.  441 U.S. 667 (1979). 
245.  Pub. L. No. 92-318, § 901, 86 Stat. 235, 373 (current version at 20 U.S.C. § 1981 (2012)). 
246.  422 U.S. 66 (1975). 
247.  Cannon, 441 U.S. at 689–703. Four years after enacting Title IX and three years before Cannon, 
Congress made the Court’s subsequent inference more supportable by amending 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1970) 
specifically to allow attorney’s fees in Title IX actions. See Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976, 
Pub. L. 94-559, 90 Stat. 2641 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2012)). It would be difficult to find a clearer, 
albeit implicit, manifestation of congressional intent. 
248.  Cannon, 441 U.S. at 703. 
249.  Id. at 706.   
250.  Cal. v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287 (1981). 
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Congress wanted a private of action in Title IX, none appeared there.251 Citing 
seventeen statutes in which federal courts had implied private rights of action, he 
stated, “It defies reason to believe that in each of these statutes Congress 
absentmindedly forgot to mention an intended private action.”252 He condemned 
the Court’s creation of common law and regarded the three of the four criteria as 
“invit[ing] independent judicial lawmaking.”253 
With all respect to the Court,254 that is precisely what it has been doing 
concerning the scope of federal-question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. To 
borrow from Justice Powell, if congressional policy with respect to the meaning of 
§ 1331 and its relationship to state judicial jurisdiction is so clear, why is there 
absolutely no indication of it in any legislative materials? At least in Cannon, the 
majority could point to a policy clearly embodied in a statute: discrimination in 
education on the basis of sex was unacceptable to Congress and the President, the 
majoritarian branches. 
The interpretation of the federal-jurisdiction statute was stable as of 1936.255 
Only three years after Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Mottley,256 the best known 
articulation of the well-pleaded-complaint rule, Congress recodified the statute 
without altering its scope, although the wording changed slightly.257 In 1916, 
Justice Holmes announced his law-that-creates-the-cause-of-action test,258 but the 
well-pleaded-complaint rule explains the decision equally well.259 Three of the 
Justices who joined that Holmes opinion also joined a six-to-two majority only 
five years later, holding there was federal-question jurisdiction in a hybrid case260 
because the well-pleaded federal issue was outcome determinative.261 The Court 
ignored Justice Holmes’s anguished dissent in support of his previously expressed 
view.262 That circumstance strongly suggests that those three Justices regarded the 
Holmes test as dictum, basing their votes instead on the well-pleaded-complaint 
                                                                                                                                                 
251.  Cannon, 441 U.S. at 742 (Powell, J., dissenting).   
252.  Id.  
253.  Id.  
254.  Well, at least as much respect as I can muster at this point. 
255.  See supra text accompanying note 223. 
256.  211 U.S. 149 (1908). 
257.  See Act of Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 24, 36 Stat. 1087, 1091. Succeeding recodifications occurred in 
1948, 1958, 1976, and 1980. See Act of Dec. 1, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-486, § 2(a), 94 Stat. 2369 (removing 
jurisdictional-amount requirement); Act of Oct. 21, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-574, § 733(2), 90 Stat. 2721; Act of 
July 25, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-554, § 1331(a), 72 Stat. 415; Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 1331, 62 Stat. 869, 
930.  With the exception of dropping the jurisdictional-amount requirement, none change the scope of federal-
question jurisdiction, currently codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2012).  
258.  Am. Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257, 260 (1916). See supra note 179. 
259.  See supra note 179. Justice Holmes was part of the unanimous Court that decided Louisville & 
Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908).   
260.  See Smith v. Kan. City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180 (1921). 
261.  Id. at 199, 201. This added nothing to the test for federal-question jurisdiction. The test of whether an 
allegation in a complaint is well pleaded is whether, were that allegation removed, the complaint would succumb 
to a motion to dismiss for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). 
See Trojan Horse, supra note 27, at 541. 
262.  Id. at 213–14 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
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rule. Justice Cardozo later mentioned the necessity of the federal issue being in 
dispute,263 but the Court had articulated that years before,264 and it is implicit in the 
Mottley test. 
There the situation rested until Franchise Tax Board v. Construction Laborers 
Vacation Trust265 introduced “substantiality.”266 That statement was also dictum; 
the Court had already applied the declaratory-judgment-jurisdiction test of Skelly 
Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co. and decided that the allegation of federal law 
was not well pleaded. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Co. v. Thompson267 was the 
first actual application of the new criterion, and Justice Stevens’s majority opinion 
acknowledged that the plaintiffs had properly pleaded the federal issue in the 
negligence-per-se counts of their complaints. However, the majority ruled that the 
issue they raised was insufficiently substantial.268  Merrell Dow marks the Court’s 
embarkation on its current voyage of construction (or, more appropriately, 
reconstruction) of federal-question jurisdiction, wholly divorced from any 
demonstrable congressional intent. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Merrell Dow, with its amorphous “substantiality” criterion, began the Court’s 
current effort to restrict federal-question jurisdiction. The Court has never 
announced any real test for substantiality, apparently content to make such 
determinations ad hoc. There is little doubt that the Court’s reformation of federal-
question jurisdiction excludes cases that, prior to Merrell Dow, would have been 
in federal courts. Merrell Dow itself is an example; it is clear that jurisdictional 
law before that decision supported federal-question jurisdiction, and the federal 
court would have heard plaintiffs’ remaining claims under the doctrine of pendent 
(now supplemental) jurisdiction. Now such cases are out. 
They are not out because of anything Congress did or said. In this millennium, 
Congress has expanded the federal courts’ docket load, largely through enacting 
CAFA. Whatever Congress’s rationale, CAFA is not the work of a Congress so 
concerned about federal docket pressure that it wanted the Supreme Court to 
commence or continue a judicial project to cut back on federal-question 
jurisdiction. 
And yet, the Court’s common-law work in this area appears to be part of a 
larger effort by the Justices to reduce the federal courts’ caseload. Parallel to the 
most recent developments that this Article has discussed, the Court has also sharply 
                                                                                                                                                 
263.  See Gully v. First Nat’l Bank, 290 U.S. 109, 113 (1936). 
264.  See City of New Orleans v. Benjamin, 153 U.S. 411 (1894). 
265.  463 U.S. 1, 28 (1983).  
266.  “Even though state law creates appellant’s causes of action, its case might still “arise under” the laws 
of the United States if a well-pleaded complaint established that its right to relief under state law requires 
resolution of a substantial question of federal law in dispute between the parties.” Id. at 13 (emphasis added).   
267.  478 U.S. 804 (1986). 
268.  Id. at 814. See supra text accompanying notes 172–187. 
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raised the threshold for pleading federal-question cases by reconstruing what 
constitutes “a claim upon which relief can be granted.”269 Ironically, if Congress 
actually did have some carefully calibrated balance in mind, the Court’s recent 
pleading decisions would have upset it rather dramatically. Congress has 
participated in none of this, and it is obvious that the Court now is defining its own 
subject-matter jurisdiction. 
Doing so raises serious questions of legitimacy. The Constitution gives 
Congress the power to create federal courts beneath the Supreme Court,270 and that 
power has always included the power of defining their jurisdiction within the 
bounds of Article III.271 Now the Supreme Court challenges the exclusivity of that 
congressional power. There is, however, nothing in the Constitution that gives the 
federal judiciary the power to define its own jurisdiction, and the Court’s doing so 
undermines separation of powers. Perhaps that is why the Court attempts to 
conceal its efforts by claiming, entirely without evidence, that it is all Congress’s 
doing. 
Eighty years ago, Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins272 noted that for ninety-six years, 
the Court had set itself and the rest of the federal courts above the Constitution by 
its decision in Swift v. Tyson.273 “If only a question of statutory construction were 
involved, we should not be prepared to abandon a doctrine so widely applied 
throughout nearly a century.  But the unconstitutionality of the course pursued has 
now been made clear, and compels us to do so.”274  The Court relied in part275 on 
Justice Holmes’s far more pointed criticism of Swift a decade earlier. Thus, the 
doctrine of Swift v. Tyson is, as Mr. Justice Holmes said, ‘an unconstitutional 
assumption of powers by the Courts of the United States which no lapse of time or 
respectable array of opinion should make us hesitate to correct.’”276 
As Yogi Berra apparently never actually said,277 “It’s like déjà-vu, all over 
                                                                                                                                                 
269.  FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 
550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
270.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9. 
271.  See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; HSComm3Jud85, supra note 121, at 28 (testimony of Hon. Albert B. 
Maris, Chairman, Committee on Revision of the Laws of the Judicial Conference of the U.S.) (“[T]he Constitution 
delimits the area in which the Federal jurisdiction may be exercised, but it doesn’t precisely define that area; it 
leaves that definition to Congress, and that has always been the construction from the foundation of our 
Government.”). See also WRIGHT & KANE, supra note 34, § 10, at 45. 
272.  304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
273.  41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842). 
274.  Erie, 304 U.S. at 77–78. In a classic understatement, the Erie Court appeared to try to downplay the 
matter. Id. at 79–80 (“In disapproving that doctrine we do not hold unconstitutional section 34 of the Federal 
Judiciary Act of 1789 or any other act of Congress. We merely declare that in applying the doctrine this Court 
and the lower courts have invaded rights which in our opinion are reserved by the Constitution to the several 
states.”) (emphasis added). With all respect to the Court, a nearly century-long violation of the Constitution by 
the entire federal judiciary at the direction of the Supreme Court is no “mere” matter. 
275.  Id. at 79. 
276.  Id. (quoting Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab and Transfer Co., 
276 U.S. 518, 533 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting)). 
277.  See Victor Mather & Katie Rogers, Behind the Yogi-isms: Those Said and Unsaid, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 
23, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/24/sports/yogi-berra-yogi-isms-quotes-explored.html (on file with 
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